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Glossary
Afghani (or Afs) official Afghan currency
ashar communal, reciprocal work (typically around life cycle events)
gharibkar work activities carried out by the poor
ograyi form of credit in which goods are loaned to seller and paid for after
final sale
mozarebat partnership agreement in which one person provides money or assets
and other time and labour, from which profits are shared
wakil-e gozar neighbourhood representative
wasita relations to powerful people
Zor Abad informal settlement; literally, “place taken by force”
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Acronyms
AKDN Aga Khan Development Network
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
EC European Commission
GoA Government of Afghanistan
I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
IDP Internally Displaced Person
MoUD Ministry of Urban Development
NDF National Development Framework
NSP National Solidarity Programme
SLF Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
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The cities of Afghanistan are growing fast.
The pace of this growth exceeds the planning
and management capabilities of the already
overwhelmed central government and of
under-resourced municipalities, making them
unable and, at times, unwilling to effectively
work on reducing levels of urban poverty and
vulnerability. As a result, poor urban
households are excluded from the most basic
services and are forced to live day-to-day on
meagre, unreliable income flows in often
health-threatening environments. 
Against this background of unprecedented
and largely unplanned urbanisation in the
country, the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU) carried out research
in five Afghan cities to explore the ground
realities of urban poverty and vulnerability.
By understanding the diverse livelihood
strategies poor and vulnerable households
pursue, and how and why such strategies
change over time, this AREU study hopes to
inform policy formulation that builds on the
capabilities, needs and priorities of
marginalised urban populations.
The report draws on empirical data from
individual studies conducted across five urban
locations. Three case studies — in Kabul,
Herat and Jalalabad — involved longitudinal
research among 40 households over a 12-
month period. In addition, short-term city
case studies were conducted in Mazar-i-Sharif
and Pul-i-Khumri over a two to three-week
period in each location. In the first case, the
life paths of poor urban households were
observed and tracked over an entire year.
Economic changes and shifts in the livelihood
trajectories of households were documented
and the movements of households tracked
along a continuum of livelihood security and
vulnerability. In the Mazar-i-Sharif and Pul-
i-Khumri cases, research focused on specific
livelihood situations in poor urban settlements
in northern Afghanistan, capturing the
dynamics in intermediate-sized cities. This
Executive Summary
synthesis report presents key findings and a
comparative analysis of the results from
across these study sites.
Key findings
Access to land, services and social
infrastructure
• Afghanistan’s poor urban population have
little or no access to basic services and
social infrastructure. This is a result of
limited resources, combined with the
authorities’ unwillingness and lack of
capacity to serve effectively. Exclusion
from basic services adversely affects the
capacity of the urban poor to earn
adequate income and acquire the
necessary human assets to have quality
of life. While lack of services has long
been recognized as a major problem in
urban Afghanistan, investments in safe
water supply, sanitation, and shelter
programmes have been largely
insufficient.
• Part of the problem lies in the fact that
municipalities and other government
institutions tend to ignore informal
settlements that lack legal status,
although they make up a significant share
of the population in Afghanistan’s major
cities. The unwillingness to develop a
pro-poor land policy that acknowledges
informal settlements, and the absence
of a coherent vision that includes these
settlements in urban planning lead to the
social exclusion of citizens. Their right
to the city is neglected by a malfunction-
ing planning system that fails to recognize
the urgency in releasing sufficient land
for legal occupation.
• The minimal to non-existent provision of
the most basic human needs to those
residing in informal settlements forces
families and communities to develop
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burdensome and frequently health-
threatening coping strategies. This is most
obvious when it comes to water supply.
Many urban households have no access
to clean water and are driven to spend
their already limited income on private
water supply. Families who cannot afford
to do so end up relying on polluted surface
sources or travelling long distances to the
nearest public pump or well.
• Polluted water, along with the absence
of sanitation systems, contribute to
chronic health problems. Illnesses that
could be prevented are instead made
worse by the absence of a health facility
nearby and the high cost of private
healthcare. This prevents many remote
communities from seeking treatment for
chronic illnesses or emergency care, much
less preventive check-ups. Exclusion from
such basic services makes families highly
susceptible to diseases and health
problems, compromising their ability to
earn a living.
• Access to education is problematic for
most poor urban households across
Afghanistan. Children are required either
to work for an income, or assist in
performing household chores. For many
children living in remote communities,
attending school is nearly impossible with
the distant location of learning facilities.
Urban labour markets and household
consumption
• Informal employment, which lacks
protection and income security, is the
main livelihood source for the great
majority of Afghanistan’s urban
population. While it provides poor
households with an immediate source of
income, families end up being more
vulnerable with irregular, low-paying jobs
that force them to deploy women and
children — at times, to exploitative and
hazardous types of work — for additional
income. Moreover, households are often
forced to be highly mobile to adapt to
changing labour demands across different
locations and seasons. As a result, they
experience constant variation in income
levels, reducing their ability to plan for
the future.
• The two biggest types of employment for
the bottom strata of the urban labour
force are self-employment and casual
wage labour, both of which are
characterised by low and erratic incomes
and high seasonality. Home-based work,
as the third biggest type of employment,
is largely the domain of women. It is
characterised by even lower incomes.
Dependency on home-based work varied
across study sites. For example, home-
based income activities account for more
than a third of all paid work in Herat,
whereas in Jalalabad, such work hardly
takes place.
• Household structure and composition are
key determinants of income levels:
households able to mobilise male labour
are better off than those unable to do
so. There is a critical link between urban
vulnerability and health, particularly that
of male breadwinners. Their physical
wellbeing impacts their ability to secure
food, which in turn influences the health
of the entire family.
• Insecurity of employment leads to income
irregularity and chronic shortage of cash
for the urban poor, making it hard for
them to establish savings. Faced with the
comparatively high cost of living in Afghan
cities, a huge majority of households
resort to borrowing money just to be able
to afford basic food consumption, let
alone pursue investments in healthcare
and housing. In all cities, except for Herat,
average expenditures for basic necessities
exceed average incomes for members of
the study population. A great majority of
the households are in constant debt as a
consequence.
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Household resources, social assets and
representation
• The asset base of the studied urban
households is not sufficiently diversified
to lift them out of poverty in any lasting
way. Their reliance on scant and
inconsistent resources adds pressure on
their coping mechanisms. This is the case
for families that live on paid labour, as
well as those relying on the goodwill and
support of others.
• The most vulnerable households also shift
residence regularly, both in pursuit of
work and to avoid rising rent. This deprives
them of a more permanent place to call
home and decreases their chances of
acquiring legal housing, which represents
the most important physical asset for the
urban poor.
• Crisis and emergency situations are usually
cushioned by social relations, notably
that of family and relatives. They serve
as a safety net, an indispensable social
asset for urban livelihood security.
• Informal social networks rarely reach
beyond neighbourhoods or next of kin and
there is very little evidence of efforts to
promote or expand community relations
among the urban poor in Afghanistan.  A
majority of the studied households
appeared to have strong social
connections that are indispensable to
maintain ing exist ing l ivel ihood
opportunities. However, their networks
essentially serve as a means to survival;
the resources acquired through them
hardly allow urban families to rise above
poverty.
• In addition, such social networks tend to
be overused. Without basic material
resources in place, mutual assistance is
difficult to sustain and leaning consistently
on social networks could overburden and
compromise relations. Informal social
protection systems may quickly erode,
especially for households with the most
precarious livelihood strategies, who tend
to borrow more than they could pay.
These families are left even more
vulnerable: once they have exhausted
the resources of relatives and friends,
they are left without a safety net.
• There is little evidence of poor and
vulnerable households being involved in
local level decision-making processes.
This relates, in part, to the control of
community organisations held by male
elders, who do not always represent the
more marginalised members. Thus, poor
households bear the brunt of huge
backlogs in service delivery and are
excluded from urban planning.
• A responsive government is central to
successful representation. The city case
studies provided little evidence of city
or national government responsiveness
to the needs and interests of the poor.
It is clear that there is a lack of capacity,
resources and political will among civil
servants.
Recommendations
Stimulate broad-based labour intensive
growth at the national and city levels
• Evaluate Afghanistan’s open market
approach and consider the possible
economic and employment gains from
import substitution and protectionism in
some key industries, such as cement and
cotton/textiles.
• Ensure that opportunities for good quality
work are valued as much as the quantity
of jobs created. Thus, a holistic strategy
supporting urban employment creation
must include market analysis of demand
for higher value products and the labour
and skill requirements associated with
them. This must be combined with the
development of vocational training and
formal education programmes to develop
a labour force with the appropriate skills.
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• Develop a broad planning framework that
anticipates the continuing increase in
urban populations, resulting from the
influx of returnees from neighbouring
countries, as well as from pull factors
drawing rural residents to urban areas.
• Facilitate the participation of women in
the urban labour force under improved
conditions, where their work is valued
appropriately and they are given a real
choice about place of work. In addition,
the burden of household work must be
reduced by supporting community child
care initiatives and improving access to
basic services.
Redress the imbalance caused by the
predominantly rural focus of national
development assistance in Afghanistan
• Design and implement nationwide urban
poverty reduction programmes to improve
the quality of life of the urban poor at a
scale approaching the reality of the
problem. These programmes must
recognize the inter-linkages between the
myriad problems underlying urban poverty
and take an integrated versus sectoral
approach, linking job creation, skills
building and urban service provision, as
well as improving urban governance.
• Streamline coordination and cooperation
be tween  l i ne  m in i s t r i e s  and
municipalities.  Much of the backlog in
service provision and barriers to pro-poor
urban development derive from the
inability and unwillingness of government
agencies to work together. Incentives
must be developed to ensure effeciency.
Successful coordination structures from
other countries could be studied and
adapted in developing effective urban
governance institutions in Afghanistan.
• Increase donor support for the
development and implementation of
urban poverty reduction and capacity
building programmes within government
institutions. Supporting sustainable urban
development requires medium to long
term financial commitments, not short-
term funded pilots that are not brought
to scale. Donor support must be
comprehensive to achieve successful
institutional reforms.
Increase the human capital of the urban
poor through improved access to quality
healthcare and education
• Extend affordable and proximate health
care facilities into or close to poor urban
neighbourhoods, allowing low income
groups to regularly access both
preventative and curative care.
• Plans for the allocation of new schools
must be made in a way that distributes
access equitably across urban locations
to promote school attendance.
• Efforts to provide proper school buildings
should be accompanied by greater efforts
to ensure quality teaching and teaching
support.
Develop risk mitigating social protection
programmes, supporting a shift away from
reliance on the coping capacity and
resourcefulness of the urban poor
• Develop and finance national social
protection programmes to support the
most vulnerable (families without able
bodied male workers, families dependent
on disabled members for income, etc.)
and to invest in programmes supporting
asset diversification for the poor to assist
them out of poverty.
• Provide donor support for urban poverty
reduction programmes that go beyond
physical upgrading and technical service
provision to address social insecurities.
• Build the political will and capacity of
national and city level actors (both
government and non-government) to
improve their abilities to address social
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protection issues at the required scale in
the urban sector.
Negotiate a path between the reality of
burgeoning informality and the rigidity of
formal master planning
• Build capacity among municipal leaders
and staff to move them away from a
solely technical planning approach linked
to a master plan. Help them accept the
importance of including citizens in the
planning process and to develop more
flexible tools reflecting the on-the-ground
reality of all urban residents, particularly
the poor.
Recognize and legalise informal settlements
• Develop a national urban land policy in
line with the aim of equitable
development. Establish guidelines and
categories for municipalities that would
facilitate recognizing and legalising
existing informal settlements.  The policy
must also consider how to accommodate
the minority living on untenable land.
• Provide security of tenure to residents in
recognized informal settlements, with
recommendations for approaches to land
titling coming from an analysis of best
practices in other similar post-conflict
and Islamic contexts.
Ensure universal coverage with basic
services (water, drainage and sanitation,
electricity, access roads); moving
incrementally toward this goal will require:
• The political will among state institutions
to serve the poor.
• Improved communication between
government institutions involved in service
delivery, including a detailing of roles
and responsibilities and establishing a
means of coordination.
• Improved communication and coordination
between government and non-government
agencies involved in service provision,
for better distribution of  responsibilities
and to share lessons learned and best
practices.
• Community consultation, involving both
women and men, to devise appropriate
service standards and allocate operation
and maintenance responsibilities.
• Technical creativity in devising ways to
deliver services to some harder-to-reach
areas, ensuring that the work of disparate
agencies links up at the city level.
• Recognition of the employment creation
potential of service delivery and
involvement of poor urban residents
(women and men) as small scale
entrepreneurs.
Acknowledge the important contribution
of informal economic actors to the city
• Vendors and street sellers and their role
in the urban market should be
acknowledged, not as a nuisance, but as
important contributors to the economic
life of the city. Recognition can come
through some form of licensing,
transparently developed to avoid chances
of unscrupulous rent-seeking.
• The needs of street vendors and the
importance of local markets must be
recognized in city plans; they must be
planned for and not marginalised.
• Institute an inclusive consultation process
to discuss how to regulate informal
economic activity and to ensure that the
needs of informal actors and the
municipalities are represented. This
means ending harassment and rent-
seeking and guaranteeing that vending
activities do not impinge on the effective
operation of municipalities.
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1 Government of Afghanistan (2004), Securing Afghanistan’s Future, Kabul: GoA.
All major cities in Afghanistan have
experienced significant population growth
during the last decade. Conflicts, drought
and refugees returning home after the fall
of the Taliban in 2001 have all contributed
to the rapid pace of urbanisation unfolding
in major cities. This trend is ongoing and has
been accelerated by growth rates twice as
high as in the rural areas of the country, with
an estimated doubling of urban populations
in Afghanistan by the year 20151.  Con-
sequently, challenges for urban planning and
management are manifold. Government
agencies, municipalities and the international
aid community alike are compelled to think
about how to best address increased urban
poverty and vulnerability occurring in the
wake of such rapid growth. Despite this
unprecedented and largely unplanned
urbanisation in the country, little is formally
known and documented about the living
conditions of urban residents in Afghanistan,
and the real life challenges families face as
they try to survive day-to-day.
It is against this background that the
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU) carried out research on urban
livelihoods and vulnerability in five Afghan
cities. AREU recognizes the need to address
this crucial knowledge gap and to develop a
detailed understanding of: the diverse
livelihood strategies carried out by poor and
vulnerable urban populations; the contexts
in which people pursue particular livelihoods;
their ability to access services; and how and
why their adopted livelihood strategies change
over time. This research has been undertaken
with the overall objective of informing the
national policy formulation process — to
influence it in such a way that policy making
responds more meaningfully to the needs and
1.  Introduction
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priorities of poor and vulnerable urban
families and builds on their energy and
capabilities.
The research also aims to help actors involved
in international development assistance to
implement appropriate, diverse, effective
and practical interventions that strengthen
the livelihoods of the urban poor. To achieve
this objective, the research design developed
indicators that explain why some households
manage to achieve longer term wellbeing
and even build asset portfolios, while others
endure persistent poverty. In doing so, the
research helps illustrate and explain the
heterogeneous nature of urban poverty in
Afghanistan.
This report draws on empirical data from
individual studies conducted across five urban
locations. As a synthesis report, it presents
key findings from across these study sites,
as well as a comparative analysis of the
longitudinal research carried out in three
large urban centres: Kabul, Herat, and
Jalalabad; and short-term research in two
additional sites: Mazar-i-Sharif and Pul-i-
Khumri2. In the first case, the life paths of
poor urban households were observed and
tracked over an entire year. Economic changes
and shifts in the livelihood trajectories of
households were documented and the
movements of households tracked along a
continuum of livelihood security and
vulnerability. The complementary short-term
case studies in Mazar-i-Sharif and Pul-i-Khumri
were undertaken with a focus on specific
livelihood situations in poor urban
settlements, in order to cover a major city
in northern Afghanistan and capture the
dynamics in an intermediate-sized city.3
Building on the findings of these five individual
city case studies, this synthesis report provides
analytical commentary on the emerging
themes and trends that are critical for
understanding and responding to urban
livelihood insecurity across all cities. The
report also offers readers local context and
peculiarities that distinguish each location,
exploring both differences and similarities
between study sites.
2 Schütte, S. (2006), Searching for Security: Urban Livelihoods in Kabul, Kabul: AREU; Schütte, S. (2006), Gaining Some
Ground: Urban Livelihoods in Jalalabad, Kabul: AREU; Schütte, S. (2006), Poverty amid Prosperity: Urban Livelihoods in
Herat, Kabul: AREU.
3 Schütte, S. (2006), Poor, Poorer, Poorest: Urban Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul: AREU; and Schütte
S. (2006), Dwindling Industry, Growing Poverty: Urban Livelihoods in Pul-i-Khumri, Kabul: AREU.
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2.1 Background
In 2001, Afghanistan emerged from 22 years
of war to face increased economic, political
and social challenges. In the wake of a
protracted drought (1999-2001) and a decade
of relentless political violence through years
of civil war and Taliban oppression, the
predominantly rural economy was severely
weakened. Livelihoods were devastated by
the decimation of livestock and agricultural
production. Falling incomes, loss of assets
and the ravages of war saw over 5 million
people displaced as refugees in neighbouring
countries. As a recent World Bank report
suggests, “Afghanistan was essentially left
out of the last 25 years of global development,
with virtually no increase in per capita income
during this period and an average life
expectancy of only 43 years.”4 Indeed,
Afghanistan remains one of the world’s
poorest countries, with an average per capita
GDP of US$300 per annum (including opium).
It has persistently poor social indicators and
a gender gap only exceeded by Niger.5.........
From this disheartening base the economy
has recovered fairly well, although at a
declining rate.6 To a significant degree,
economic growth has been associated with
the cessation of drought and war, as well as
the benefits of reconstruction, such as the
booming construction industry. Sustaining
the targeted nine percent growth rate will
require higher agricultural yields, less
dependence on the poppy economy and
diversification of economic activities with
the growth of other sectors.
Cities play a crucial role in stimulating the
national economy through local economic
development and the facilitation of regional
and international trade. At present many
economic opportunities — and related
livelihood opportunities — are confined to
the informal economy. While it provides poor
urban families with an immediate means of
livelihood, operating in this unregulated
informal economy also means no job security,
earning income from temporary work that
do not always translate into sustainable
livelihoods. Moreover, when income is
irregular, there is less capacity to afford
basic services, much less own a home or save
money for the future.
For internally displaced persons (IDPs),
resources are even more limited. As refugees
forced to live a transient life across rural-
urban and regional and national boundaries,
it is much more difficult for them to establish
links with social networks. As a result, they
lose an important safety net, given that
access to employment, housing and loans
depends on knowing people with influence
and who are widely connected within a
community. Opportunities that do arise as a
result of growing political stability and
reconstruction do not usually extend to those
who are unconnected and vulnerable.
IDPs and refugees, who returned after the
cessation of hostilities in 2001, found little
to support a living in the countryside. In
search of adequate income, many families
made their way to Afghanistan’s national and
provincial capitals. Even those who remained
in the rural areas diversified their livelihoods
by sending some household members to towns
and cities. This intensified competition for
urban livelihood opportunities. While accurate
statistics remain unavailable, it is generally
2. The Political Economy of Afghan Urban Livelihoods
4 World Bank (2004), Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty, A Country Economic Report,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, Report No. 29551-AF, 9 Sept 2004, p. xvi.
5 UNDP (2003), Human Development Report: Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to end Human
Poverty, New York: UNDP.
6 GDP growth rates were 25-30 percent in 2002-03, 15-20 percent in 2003-04 and estimated at 8 percent in 2004-05.  See
UNDP (2004), Afghanistan National Human Development Report: Security with a Human Face. Kabul: UNDP; and GoA (2005),
Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2005. Kabul: GoA.
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accepted that Afghanistan’s urban population
has been growing at an inexorable pace since
the fall of the Taliban, adding to the
population increases experienced during the
Soviet occupation and mujahidin period. It
is estimated that the urban population now
constitutes between 23 to 30 percent of the
total population of the country.7 It is not
clear, however, whether these trends are a
temporary consequence of the collapse of
rural livelihoods or a more permanent
phenomenon, although there is evidence to
suggest that once established, households do
consolidate themselves in cities. This
research, as a longitudinal study, contributes
to a better understanding of these trends
and the characteristics of urban livelihoods.
Afghanistan’s political institutions and
processes have been severely disrupted by
years of conflict. By the year 2000, the central
state had virtually collapsed as a legitimate
political entity. It failed to maintain authority
and security and it remains weak in terms of
administrative capacity, unable to implement
effective policies and deliver public services,
particularly to the poor. In theory, Afghanistan
has a highly centralised state but in reality,
it has experienced a form of de facto
decentralisation. In many cases, the relative
autonomy of regional authorities has been
built around illegal seizure of local resources
and revenue streams and is not always
accompanied by local level public investment.
“Warlordism” and the absence of the “rule
of law” have been fuelled by opium
production and the narcotics trade, which
thrive in lawlessness and insecurity. It has
been argued that “the opium economy is the
lynchpin of a “vicious circle” of insecurity,
weak government, powerful warlords and
drug money,”8 with the latter feeding into
military assets that support local and regional
fiefdoms.
Clearly, Afghanistan’s economic and political
future requires a vigorous approach to national
unity and central state building, a strategy
7 Beall, J. and D. Esser (2005), Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities, AREU Issues
Paper Series, Kabul: AREU, March 2005, p. 7.
8 World Bank (2004), Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty, p. xvi.
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explicitly expressed in the Government’s
National Development Framework (NDF) and
S e c u r i n g  A f g h a n i s t a n ’ s  F u t u r e :
Accomplishments and the Strategic Path
Forward (SAF).9 A new Constitution and
successful presidential and parliamentary
elections have constituted important first
steps toward stability and national
governance. As the political process continues
to evolve, one outstanding challenge is to
reform the bureaucracy. While public
administration is highly centralised on paper,
it has weak links with and control over
provinces and municipalities, which, taken
together, have been largely ineffective to
date in achieving local level economic
development, governance and service
delivery. There is a critical tension between
the national imperative to strengthen the
centre and the need at the city level to
ensure that effective municipal structures
and processes are developed and supported.
At present, only a small proportion of the
population, mainly the urban and provincial
elites, makes a decent living and has access
to local level services such as good health-
care, education, safe water supply and
sanitation. Access to urban labour markets,
infrastructure and services must be extended
to the poor and vulnerable. This will involve
breaking down existing power structures and
removing the influence of vested interests
— goals which may be formidable yet not
impossible to achieve.
2.2 Sustainable urban liveli-
hoods: Framing the analysis
The term “livelihoods” has been used to refer
to assets, income-generating activities and
the access to both (mediated by institutional
and social relations). Together, these
elements determine an individual’s or a
household’s quality of life.10 The idea of
sustainable livelihoods became very influential
in the development community among those
who recognized the need to move beyond
money-metric concepts of poverty to include
a more holistic and dynamic understanding
of deprivation. Influenced by Amartya Sen’s
analysis of poverty and Robert Chambers’
exploration of risk and vulnerability,
development practitioners started looking at
livelihoods with a multidimensional approach
to social disadvantage, paying attention to
people’s vulnerabilities, capabilities and
endowments.11 Such an approach regarded
a household’s livelihood sustainable when it
allows the family to cope with economic
stresses, recover from shocks and consistently
maintain or enhance its financial capabilities
and assets without depleting its natural
resource base.
A common feature across existing livelihoods
frameworks is the assessment of the strength
of people’s “capitals” or “assets”. One of
the most widely adapted frameworks is the
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF),
developed by the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development
(DFID). The SLF identifies five types of capital:
human, financial, physical, social and
natural.12 Human capital constitutes the
labour resources available to households and
their quality. Financial capital refers to the
savings, credit, remittances and pensions,
which allow households different income
streams and livelihood options. Physical
capital comprises basic infrastructure such
as housing, transport, water supply and
communications, as well as the equipment
and tools by which people pursue their
livelihoods. Natural capital refers to natural
resources useful to livelihoods such as land,
water and public resources: rivers or common
9 GoA (2004), Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward (SAF), Kabul: GoA.
10 Ellis, F. (2000), Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 10.
11 Sen, A.K. (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Chambers, R. and G. Conway (1992), Sustainable
Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century, IDS Discussion Paper No. 296, Brighton:IDS, University of Sussex.
12 Carney, D. (1998), Implementing the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, in D. Carney (ed.), Sustainable Rural Livelihoods:
What Contribution Can we Make? London: Department for International Development, pp. 3-23.
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land. Social capital consists of relationships
based on trust and membership in a group or
community. Such social networks are relied
upon for employment, loans and other types
of assistance. All of these assets help families
undertake household responsibilities and gain
access to labour and more institutions of
society.
The various frameworks reviewed for the
study also include analysis of vulnerability,
the likely trends and shocks that could
influence livelihoods, as well as the structures
and processes that determine who gets access
to markets, shelter or decision-making arenas.
The latter is very important to livelihood
analysis in the Afghan context, where systems
and structures often operate on the basis of
wasita — knowing influential people, who
could provide access to livelihood assets and
even positions of power. An analysis of urban
livelihoods in Afghanistan demonstrates that
reciprocal networks of support, while
indispensable as an informal social protection,
can sometimes become an obstacle to poor
and vulnerable groups accessing decision
makers beyond their community. For example,
a weak wakil-e gozar may fall under the
control of a commander and stand in the way
of other citizens, who are more active in
developing political assets through direct
dealings with local officials, politicians or
NGOs.
One criticism about the Sustainable
Livelihoods Framework is its inadequate
emphasis on institutional factors and
governance issues, falling short in addressing
the significance of politics and the role played
by voice and rights in determining livelihood
outcomes. These critiques are particularly
important to understanding the dynamics
around urban livelihoods and to adapting a
framework that factors in social asymmetries,
the complexities of the institutional context
and the prominent role played by politics
and power in urban settings.13
Perceptions of poverty in many urban areas
are not only associated with material
deprivation but also include the more psycho-
social issues of respect and dignity, stigma
and exclusion. Also relevant is an assessment
of which forms of social relationships people
tend to align themselves with and how such
connections relate to the immediate needs
of their households, for instance, land and
labour. It is important to recognize that in
some cases, poverty is not necessarily
exacerbated by exclusion from resources or
employment, but by power imbalances, which
influence how people gain access to resources.
Individuals with less power in social
relationships may have to make trade-offs
between dependence on a source for
employment, land or credit needed for
immediate survival, and the ability to make
independent choices that could lift them out
of poverty in the medium to long term. They
become locked in negative social relations,
which may provide security today but at the
cost of long term growth prospects.14 For
example, a family may obtain land through
connections to a commander who grabbed
it. This provides short-term security of tenure
through the commander’s protection but
could then lead to future insecurity if the
relation to the commander deteriorates, or
land policy reforms are implemented,
nullifying the commander’s authority over
the grabbed land.
In general, it has been a challenge to capture
such dynamics in a livelihoods framework
intended to address urban issues.
Nevertheless, a strategic approach, including
a framework specific to a certain setting, is
necessary in tackling urban problems. Having
a framework to start with allows planners to
link micro-level analysis of how poor people
cope and prosper, with how city institutions
13 Some authors suggest the inclusion of a sixth category: “political capital,” claiming that social capital does not capture
the complexity of urban social and institutional interactions. See Beall, J. (2005), “Urban Livelihoods” in C. Toumain and
B. Wisner (eds), Towards A New Map of Africa, London: Earthscan Publications, pp. 97-112.
14 Wood, G. (2003), “Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The ‘Faustian Bargain’”, World Development 31(3): 455-71.
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support or hinder opportunities for them to
achieve quality of life. This linkage is
particularly important in analysing urban
livelihoods in the Afghan context, where
formal and informal institutions largely hinder
individual and collective efforts to secure
livelihoods. Part of the obstacle to poverty
reduction is the lack of capacity and political
will among local government officials, whose
personal interests often come before official
duties. This prevailing attitude may not only
lead to corrupt practices, it also deprives
the poor of the services and security they
need in order to have a chance at pursuing
a better life.
In the Afghan context, a livelihoods framework
can structure an analysis of how poor urban
dwellers navigate their way through a highly
imperfect institutional environment (state,
market, NGOs/civil society, family); how they
negotiate within different levels and
structures of power to achieve the best
possible outcome for their livelihoods. As it
stands, this “best possible” outcome falls far
short of the national government’s goal of
achieving equitable development and pro-
poor growth.
Figure 1 provides a framework adapted to
urban settings, highlighting the key elements
pertaining to a livelihoods perspective. In
relation to the vulnerability context, the
study findings clearly demonstrate that
seasonality is an inevitable feature of low-
income employment in urban areas. Moreover,
some of the households investigated in this
study combined seasonal work in cities with
agricultural labour.
In addition, urban dwellers are subject to
shocks and stresses experienced in cities.
Figure 1. A framework for understanding sustainable urban livelihoods15
15 Adapted from DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets; and Rakodi, C. and T. Lloyd-Jones, eds (2002), Urban
Livelihoods, A People-Centred Approach to Reducing Poverty, London: Earthscan, p. 9.
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Many towns and urban communities across
Afghanistan have yet to recover from decades
of conflict. Inflationary pressures also make
the cost of living particularly difficult for
poor urban dwellers. In Kabul, for example,
an increased demand for housing due to the
influx of foreigners, returnees and IDPs has
led to rent hikes and pressure on land in the
last several years. Confounding the problem
was the prevalence of land grabbing — a
profound shock to many families who lost
their properties. The winter months also
provide a regular source of stress for poor
urban dwellers, who could barely afford the
high costs related to fuel and ill health.
The policy and institutional environment in
Figure 1, the box on the right, represents
the role of institutions in the livelihoods of
the poor.  It is here that power, inequality
and the terms of inclusion of the poor enter
into the analysis of urban livelihoods.  Thus,
it is a central element of the framework that
can provide not only a realistic assessment
of the coping mechanisms of the urban poor,
but also of the constrained environment in
which many families struggle to eke out what
is often meagre living.
Figure 1 also highlights the role of
municipalities as an important area for
analysis. In Afghanistan, their role relates
primarily to land, housing, and local economic
development but there can be areas of
overlap and tension between municipalities
and line ministries, particularly in the capital
city, Kabul. The responsibilities of local
authorities link to urban livelihoods in two
important ways. In the first place they help
determine how effectively people can
undertake their day-to-day productive and
reproductive activities. For example, cheap
and reliable transport allows poor people in
peripheral settlements to travel daily to
central labour and commodity markets.
Municipal functions are also critical in ensuring
that people not only survive but are able to
save and prosper in a vibrant local economic
environment. Below is a sample of the
discussions clarifying the key role of local
leadership vis-à-vis urban disadvantage:
Urban poverty is much influenced by
what city municipal governments do
or do not do; also by what they can
or cannot do. As an understanding of
poverty widens — for instance to
include poor quality and/or insecure
housing, inadequate services and lack
of civil and political rights — so does
the greater current or potential role
of local government to contribute to
poverty reduction.16
It is clear that the urban poor and the
livelihoods they pursue are closely linked
with municipal structures and patterns of
local governance that largely determine their
access to or exclusion from necessary
resources. In the Afghan urban context, these
structures and patterns are often inefficient,
impeding the urban poor’s search for
sustainable livelihoods. Such institutional
deficiencies may be attributed to a number
of factors, including lack of political will,
lack of capacity and resources, and a struggle
between fulfilling personal interests and the
state’s responsibilities.
In general, cities are regarded as the engines
that drive economic growth, where
governments and their partners are best able
to deliver infrastructure and services on scale.
This is not always the case, however. The
association between urbanisation and rising
per capita income does not always hold and
even when it does, not all urban dwellers
benefit from the growth. In fact, some cities,
in their efforts to become or remain
competitive, introduce automation into
industries and production processes, pushing
wages down and excluding unskilled labour.
In Afghanistan, as the case studies show,
trends in urban livelihoods are dictated by
16 Satterthwaite, D. (2000), Editor’s Introduction: “Towards more Pro-poor Local Governments in Urban Areas”, Environment
and Urbanisation, 11(2), pp. 3-11.
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the shape of the urban economy in specific
cities, all of which are characterised by small
and stagnant labour markets or urban growth
poles that reinforce inequality more than
they address problems of poverty. Thus, the
ability of Afghan cities to drive growth is
patchy, to say the least, and even more
questionable when viewed through the prism
of public service delivery and employment
generation.
The findings of the research also illustrate
that acquiring jobs and income-earning
opportunities are a fundamental pre-
occupation for Afghanistan’s urban poor. This
is hardly surprising given their almost total
dependence on cash for survival. It must be
noted, however, that pursuing income-earning
activities outside of the home goes hand in
hand with care giving obligations within the
household. Productive work, after all, requires
good physical health and the durability of
urban households depends on the wellbeing
and education of younger and future
generations. Without a decent living
environment, it will be nearly impossible to
stay healthy and productive, much less plan
for the future. It is, therefore, important to
examine how the responsibilities for various
activities within and outside the household
are distributed; and how such distribution
influences livelihood opportunities and
outcomes and the general wellbeing of
individual members and households as a
whole.
A livelihoods perspective offers an integrated
framework for understanding the relationship
between access, resources and power and
its implications for asset building.17 Any
analysis of livelihoods must incorporate an
assessment of intra-household dynamics
because nowhere is the complex relationship
between access, resources and power more
acutely observed than in the household. The
research on Afghan cities shows how family
dynamics, in and of itself, can be considered
a livelihoods asset. Indeed, family support
to income-earning activities can be crucial
in explaining the survival or growth of one
urban household over another in a similar
external environment.18 The research shows
how the composition and structure of urban
families (who is the head of the household,
for example) influence a household’s ability
to mobilise labour and diversify strategies to
maximize income — at times to the detriment
of other members. This report, as well as
the individual city studies on which it is
based, is informed throughout by a gender
perspective and sensitivity to household
structure, headship and dynamics between
generations.
In poor countries, such as Afghanistan,
providing any form of social protection is
extremely difficult. Moreover, given the
country’s history of political and economic
turmoil, natural disasters and the ravages of
war, the national response has been oriented
toward household survival and promoting
individual enterprise, rather than efforts
toward redistribution, something that is being
reinforced by current state policy and advice
from international development agencies.19
This government approach may very well be
a recognition of the Afghan people’s
“widespread personal and private initiative”;
that they are a “resilient, creative,
opportunity-seeking and entrepreneurial
people.”20 One can argue that:
17 Bebbington, A. (1999), Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analysing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty,
World Development, 27(12), pp. 2021-2044.
18 Moser, C.O.N. (1996), Confronting Crisis, Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monograph Series, No. 7,
World Bank; and Moser, C.O.N. (1998), The Asset Vulnerability Framework, World Development.
19 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2003), Nationwide Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), Kabul:
MRRD; and World Bank (2004), Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty, A Country Economic
Report, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region, Report No. 29551-AF.
20 World Bank (2005), Afghanistan: Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection: An Initial Assessment, Human Development
Unit, South Asia Region, Report No. 29694-AF, p. i.
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Poverty and vulnerability in
Afghanistan, while extensive, have
always been and should continue to
be principally managed by the poor
themselves. As such, the challenge
for future governments will be to
harness and support the proven
capabilities of the Afghan people
toward collective national objectives
for development and prosperity.21
The resilience and fortitude of the Afghans
is not in question. However, the research
findings show that it is important not to see
rural or urban dwellers as eternally energetic
and resourceful, and local communities as
constant repositories of social care. In many
cases, poverty makes it nearly impossible for
individuals to survive, pushing them to rely
on others in their households and social
networks to make ends meet. In such
conditions, it is unacceptable for the state
and other development agencies to temper
or even withhold intervention based on the
resilience and resourcefulness of poor Afghans.
This research also shows that when people
are above the subsistence level — in urban
areas as much as anywhere else — social
support systems and networks that offer
mutual benefits continue to be operative and
effective. However, when conditions are dire
and shocks and stresses are relentless, this
reciprocal support could come under a lot of
strain. Reciprocity entails expectations and
obligations, often not equal in outcome.
When households in a community network
come under heavy economic stress, conflicts
arise not only in relation to access to
resources, but also around whose interests
are represented in appeals made to local and
city level decision making processes.
21 Ibid.
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With rapid urbanisation unfolding in
Afghanistan, it is necessary to have a
comprehensive and contextual understanding
of urban livelihoods. AREU has conducted a
number of earlier studies that provided a
useful basis on which to build this more
extensive research.22 This study took a
distinctive longitudinal approach to urban
livelihoods in Afghanistan and was based on
intensive fieldwork in three urban locations.
This was supplemented by one-off fieldwork
conducted in two additional cities in order
to check for regional differences within the
resource and time constraints involved.
In the long-term study areas — Kabul, Herat,
and Jalalabad23 — researchers worked with
a permanent sample of 40 households in each
site. They were visited monthly over a period
of one full year, allowing for in-depth
investigation of their circumstances and any
changes over time. This fieldwork produced
detailed evidence of the multiple livelihood
and coping strategies used by different types
of households and the same households at
different times. The rationale for this
approach was based on awareness that to
understand urban poverty properly, research
methods providing “snapshots” at a particular
moment in time were inadequate. A
longitudinal approach was considered
essential in order to understand why, in so
many cases, poverty persists and how in some
cases, people do manage to find ways out of
poverty. By mapping livelihood trajectories
over time and by observing and documenting
processes and changes to which people are
exposed, how they cope with them and how
they attempt to induce change themselves,
this analysis provides a more nuanced
understanding of the causal factors at work
in relation to urban poverty and vulnerability.
The selection of longitudinal study sites was
driven by the aim to include, as much as
possible, Afghanistan’s major cities and to
capture the ethnic diversity of the country.
There was also a concern to explore
differences that may arise in terms of policies,
institutions and processes that could affect
urban livelihoods. Obviously, Kabul, as the
capital and as a city that has exploded in
size in recent years, had to be included. It
was also important to include Jalalabad in
the East as a Pashtun dominated border city
close to Pakistan. Critical too was the inclusion
of Herat in the West with its wide ethnic
diversity and close proximity to Iran, believed
to have a strong influence on the city’s
livelihood activities. Afghanistan has two
additional major cities: Mazar-i-Sharif and
Kandahar. The former was included as a
short-term supplementary case study to
capture the dynamics at work in the largest
urban centre in the north of the country. The
adverse security situation in Kandahar made
implementation of this part of the research
plan impossible but it did allow the team to
include, as a substitute, the medium-sized
city of Pul-i-Khumri, which served as an
interesting case study because of its smaller
size but comparatively large industrial base.
The initial identification of neighbourhoods
and households taking part in the three long-
term study areas was accomplished by means
of focus group discussions in different
neighbourhoods, with local community
councils, as well as through collaboration
with NGOs working in the areas. In addition,
researchers sought to include different types
of households in the sample: those with
22 Beall, J. and D. Esser (2005), Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities, AREU Issues
Paper Series; Grace, J. (2003), 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability, Kabul: AREU; Hunte, P. (2004), Some
Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan, Kabul: AREU; Schütte, S. (2004), Urban Vulnerability in
Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities, Kabul: AREU.
23 For detailed city descriptions and their contextual peculiarities, see the individual case study reports by Schütte.
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diverse ethnicities, female-headed households
and those headed by people with disability,
returned refugees, or internally displaced
persons (IDPs). This way, a broader sample
was identified first, then gradually reduced
to a select sampling of 40 households based
on the diversity of household types, as well
as pragmatic considerations, such as a
household commitment to long-term
participation in the research. Regular visits
were made to households included in the
final sample, with the first visit in February
2005 and continuing with repeated monthly
visits through January 2006.
Through intensive fieldwork, the following
aspects and issues were explored:
• Narrative household histories and
household activity profiles using semi-
structured questionnaires;
• Inter- and intra-household relations, credit
relations, physical asset base and access
to basic services, migration activities,
and urban–rural linkages, using a set of
structured questionnaires implemented
once during the 12-month period;
• Economic changes through detailed
monthly monitoring of labour market
participation, income and consumption
figures, credit and indebtedness and self-
help and support activities among all 40
households, with the support of a
structured questionnaire; and
• Changes in activity and asset portfolios
and in livelihood conditions among a sub-
sample of 10 selected households, through
detailed monthly qualitative monitoring
interviews. These narrative interviews,
guided by a checklist, were typically very
time-intensive, which is why it was
decided to carry them out in a sub-sample
of households.
Due to time constraints, a different
methodological approach was applied to the
short-term study sites of Mazar-i-Sharif and
Pul-i-Khumri. In these two sites and in
consultation with NGOs and local
municipalities, poor urban settlements were
selected and group discussions held with
representatives of the local communities.
These discussions addressed a variety of
themes and provided a picture of
neighbourhoods, their histories and the status
of infrastructure and service delivery from
the perspective of community members. The
research here also explored perceptions of
differences in the livelihood situations of the
members of these communities. This initial
step was then complemented by
questionnaire-guided interviews with families,
bringing in a household perspective.
This rather ambitious research programme
was carried out without major problems,
although in the long-term study sites, working
with the same households over an extended
period with a high frequency of visits, posed
some difficulties for both researchers and
respondents. A particular challenge was
keeping the sample intact over the entire
study period, despite relocation of households
during the course of a year or seasonal
migration to different urban or rural locations.
Efforts were made to ensure that dropouts
remained at a tolerable minimum. Even under
such transient conditions, the monthly
monitoring of changes and economic activities
was carried out with a success rate of over
94 percent across all sites, with the remainder
consisting of a few dropout households —
those which temporarily left the sample
during a migration period, or those which
permanently shifted their residence to
another location. Another challenge was the
tense security situation that prevented the
research team from conducting fieldwork in
Kandahar altogether, and interrupted and
delayed research in Jalalabad when violent
demonstrations hampered the team’s
movement for one month.
In sum, the approach chosen proved to be
effective in facilitating an in-depth
understanding of households, their activities,
and living situations. Researchers were able
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit18
Synthesis Paper Series
to build relationships with respondents and
in virtually all cases have been welcomed to
revisit households to learn about their lives,
the changes they encountered, and how they
adapted. As such, the chosen research
methodology with its focus on a long-term
understanding provided an extraordinary
opportunity to observe and document urban
livelihoods from a household perspective,
and it has generated data on which to build
an assessment of livelihood strategies
prevalent among the urban poor in
Afghanistan. However, given that the selected
approach required the team to work in a
comparatively small and not randomly
selected household sample in each city, the
survey is unable to claim that it is
representative; the results reported relate
only to the studied households. Still, they do
raise issues and challenges facing a broader
selection of urban poor residents in the study
sites. An overview of the characteristics of
households in the three longitudinal study
sites is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Household sample characteristics in the longitudinal study sites
Kabul Herat Jalalabad
Returned Refugees 12 13 13
IDPs 15 13 9
Long-term residents 13 14 18
Female-headed 11 12 3
Headed by person with disability 4 3 8
Have disabled members (not household head) 4 8 2
Nuclear household 28 27 22
Extended household 12 13 18
Pashtun 8 8 32
Tajik 24 21 7
Hazara 8 4 0
Turkmen 0 4 0
Uzbek 0 1 0
Other 0 2 (Arab) 1 (Pashaie)
Total number of households 40* 40 40*
Average household size 6-7 members 7-8 members 7-8 members
Share of sample members below 18-years of age 65% 64% 59%
(N=266) (N=287) (N=322)
*In Kabul and Jalalabad, two households split during the study period. They were subsequently included in the
sample as separate units, such that in these two sites, the research was continued with 42 households. Accordingly,
the average household size in these two sites is calculated on the base of 42 households.
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24 Mc Auslan, P. (2005), Urban Land Law in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, An Issues and Options Paper,
draft 12 August 2005.
Basic services and social infrastructure play
a critical role for human asset building and
increased household and individual wellbeing.
There is a huge backlog in service delivery
apparent all over urban Afghanistan. The
problem is principally shaped by widespread
tenure insecurity and what generally has
been termed the “urban land crisis” in
Afghanistan.24 It is further fuelled by lack of
municipal resources and what appears to be
a low commitment to serve dwellers in poor
urban settlements. The problem is massive
and has major implications, not exclusively
but most critically so for the urban poor in
the country, a majority of which reside in
urban settlements that are informal and lack
legal status. Zor abad is the local term used
for these informal settlements — literally
meaning “a place taken by force” — where
people enclosed public lands and established
residence without seeking official permission.
The mushrooming of informal settlements in
Afghan cities has been accelerated by
drought, conflict, displacement and refugee
return after the overthrow of the Taliban
regime. It would be cynical to fault the people
as they are driven by the basic need for
shelter and job opportunities in the city. The
responsibility rests in a malfunctioning urban
planning system that has failed to provide
public services, particularly the release of
sufficient land for legal occupation. The
minimal to non-existent services extended
to remote and informal settlements force
households to develop often burdensome and
health-threatening strategies in order to
access infrastructure, compromising their
abilities to achieve sustainable livelihoods.
Legal tenure is often the first step to service
delivery, as well as a key asset contributing to
urban livelihood security.
The following evidence taken from the
experience of households living in the cities
4. Land, Services and Social Infrastructure
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25 The World Bank (2006), Kabul Urban Policy Notes Series n.2, Washington, DC: World Bank.
studied provide insights as to how people
cope with these conditions of informality and
service backlog, and how they actually access
basic infrastructure.
4.1 Land, housing and security
of tenure
The problem of informality of land and housing
is widespread but takes on different forms
in the various study locations. Most pressing
is the situation in Kabul, where the World
Bank estimated that 69 percent of its total
urban area is informal and lacks municipal
acceptance, thereby accommodating 80
percent of the total city population.25 This
development has been very effective in
preventing homelessness in the Afghan
capital, but lack of legal status and exclusion
from service provision in these settlements
pose serious problems for inhabitants.
In Jalalabad, the problems are quite similar,
although no figures on the degree of
informality are available. Repatriation of
returnees from abroad and severe drought
conditions in rural areas led to a constant
influx of people to Jalalabad and eventually
to the occupation of formerly public spaces
during recent years. Many spacious residential
areas were developed only in the last two
decades and bear no resemblance to the
outdated Master Plan still serving as the main
planning tool for municipal decision makers.
This leaves inhabitants insecure and exposed
to the threat of eviction. Nonetheless, there
has been some movement in policy
interpretation recently, with the municipality
deciding to formalise what used to be a
refugee colony (but only after initially
intimidating residents with bulldozers ready
to destroy the entire settlement). The
successful regularisation of the settlement,
it has to be said, was made possible only
because the neighbourhood is located in a
so-called “white area”, i.e. outside the space
covered by the Master Plan, which gave some
room for negotiation with officials. At the
very least, this example shows that land
titling is a viable option. Affected families
were willing to sacrifice and invest for a legal
title, proving that a lasting solution can be
the outcome of a decision-making process
that involves community members, who are
the ultimate beneficiaries. (Every household
was required to pay a substantial sum of
62,000 Afghani — the equivalent of US$1,265
— which did not include the resources required
to rebuild housing on newly assigned plots.)
Herat represents an exception in that tenure
insecurity is not so much a problem with most
houses erected on legal land. The issue is
more on the shortage of affordable housing
or urban land on which to build. This is
reflected in the comparatively lower rate of
house ownership in Herat and higher number
of rental housing (see Figure 2). Tenure
insecurity is most critical to the estimated
400 IDP households, which have been living
in two camps not far from the city-centre
for more than 12 years. Families taking shelter
in these makeshift houses are under constant
threat of eviction from the military, which
owns the land.
Likewise, the short-term study sites in Pul-
i-Khumri and Mazar have high degrees of
occupied land with informal status. Mazar,
for instance, has a large number of low-
income groups settling on lands formerly
grabbed and then redistributed by
commanders mostly on the fringes of town
— all of which lack basic services. Pul-i-
Khumri, in contrast, is characterised by a
huge degree of tenure insecurity concentrated
on the hillsides framing the narrow valley on
which the city spreads out. The municipality
estimates that about 85 percent of the city’s
space is informal and illegally occupied,
reflecting the situation in Kabul. Informal
settlements in both sites are acknowledged,
for the time being, by municipalities in the
absence of a clear land policy, although the
erection of new buildings in informal areas
is prohibited and controlled by local
neighbourhood representatives.
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With the exception of Herat, the enclosure
of public lands and subsequent establishment
of informal settlements all over urban
Afghanistan represents an opportunity for
poor urban dwellers and low-income groups
to self-build and gradually improve on their
housing, establishing a foundation for
managing their livelihoods in the city. When
talking about housing, however, two things
must be considered when it comes to informal
settlements. Depending on the length of
residence and the imminence of eviction,
housing can be very makeshift and often fails
to provide adequate and durable physical
shelter. At the same time, there was evidence
of many single room units erected leading to
high occupancy rates and over-crowded living
situations: on average, four to five persons
share one room among the study population
in all three longitudinal research sites.
Forty-four percent of the households studied
managed to establish their own housing, while
33 percent live free of rent on charity basis.
Five percent live in tents and 18 percent on
rent (see Figure 2). Proof of house ownership
was claimed only on rare occasions. Few
people possess customary deeds, such as
documents signed by a local neighbourhood
representative, or other papers indirectly
proving ownership, such as electricity bills
issued by the municipality (kitabche barq),
or more often municipal sanitation papers
(kitabche safahi). In fact, among the study
population, only six households in Jalalabad
had acquired an official title for their land
in the wake of the recent formalisation of
their ex-squatter settlement; 10 in Herat.
Not a single study household in Kabul owns
a legal title or can claim a right to the land
on which their house stands.
Worth highlighting is the high degree of
families living free of rent in houses belonging
to relatives or friends across sites. Often,
family-oriented households sacrifice one of
their rooms to accommodate another family.
In other cases, people are allowed to squat
in houses belonging to refugees, who have
yet to return, or households migrating for
labour opportunities. These circumstances
show the high value attached to social
relations and community networks as a source
for securing shelter, or a means to avoid
rental payments that are a heavy burden on
already tight household budgets. Across all
study sites, it was observed that rents can
be paid only very irregularly by poor urban
households living in rental housing, leading
to a high dependence on a landlord’s
benevolence and often to unproductive
indebtedness. Rental payments are a constant
Figure 2. Access to housing in the study population (120 households)
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26 Schütte, S. (2006), Gaining Some Ground: Urban Livelihoods in Jalalabad, Kabul: AREU.
27 The World Bank (2006), Kabul Urban Policy Notes Series n.2.
pressure on households relying on irregular
and poorly paid jobs, and the inability to pay
rent on time often leads to eviction and
subsequently to the loss of established
neighbourhood networks.
Housing certainly represents the most
important physical asset a household can
possess in urban Afghanistan — both in terms
of saving rent and the potential for using it
productively, but also in providing a foothold
in the urban economy. Given a chance, people
are willing to go into much hardship and risk
if only to own their homes. This is apparent
in Jalalabad’s recently formalised settlement
(see Box 1).26 People will also allocate scarce
resources to invest in improving their homes.
In Kabul alone, investments in informal
housing are estimated to reach as high as
US$1.3 billion.27
The significance of secure and solid housing
to livelihoods adds another critical argument
for speeding up the search for a solution to
the urgent problem of tenure insecurity.
Many households residing on insecure land
understandably refrain from housing
improvements. Examples where such
investments in informal housing had been
completely lost because of subsequent
eviction were encountered in Jalalabad.
However, where there is a perceived security
of tenure, as was the case in a newly emerged
hillside settlement in Kabul, people put all
resources available into the gradual
improvement of their dwellings. In fact,
physical asset building in the Kabul case was
a deliberate strategy to secure tenure and
to press the municipality for a guarantee to
let people remain on the enclosed land
(settlers did not request for a formal title;
they asked for the right to stay). It could be
argued that  tackling the problem of urban
tenure in Afghanistan expediently and
efficiently may require a general amnesty
applied to informal enclosures. This may be
worth considering first, before thinking about
Box 1. Regularising the informal
A sustainable solution to the problem of
informality in urban settlements and tenure
insecurity was found in one neighbourhood in
Jalalabad. After residents were able to prevent
eviction and bulldozing of their houses, the
municipality, in consultation with the Ministry
of Urban Development (MoUD) and the local
community, decided to implement a land titling
programme leading to secure ownership of small
plots of land for urban residents. While this was
only possible because the settlement is located
outside the original Master Plan for Jalalabad,
the example shows that finding solutions to the
problem is possible. Households, however, were
required to pay, but in spite of the 62,000 Afghani
needed to obtain a title and the huge additional
costs to rebuild houses on allotted plots, the
original dwellers succeeded in raising the money
as a group. This involved hardship, depletion of
physical assets, taking on high debts and other
risky money-raising strategies, but people were
willing to go through such adversity to have a
secure place to live in. The whole area was
restructured according to a newly produced map
delineating new roads, marking the location of
public buildings, as well as social infrastructure
for future construction. Individual plots bestowed
to each paying household were also identified.
Although by the end of the study, people were
still waiting for water access, a health clinic and
a school, the construction of boundary walls
deliniating private space and a slow and gradual
reconstruction of housing had commenced. It
needs to be seen how quickly the municipality
and MoUD will be able to provide basic
infrastructure to the new settlement, but its
provision had been part of the original
arrangement negotiated. What this positive
example shows is that a regularisation of the
informal is indeed possible — if official actors
are willing to commit, and if local communities
are involved in the planning process. Still, the
very precondition for the successful formalisation
process had been the peripheral location of the
settlement outside the Master Plan of the city.
Thinking beyond this central planning instrument
would allow realising similar projects in other
informal neighbourhoods. This is a necessary step
to take in order to find a lasting solution to the
problem of informal settlements in Afghanistan
— not only in Jalalabad, but also in its other
urban areas.
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more complicated, costly and less enforceable
titling procedures. Such approach could
provide immediate security to informal
dwellers and stimulate private investments
in housing. However, a prior assessment of
the feasibility of this approach would be in
order, as vested interests in urban land might
hamper such an initiative. This is especially
obvious when looking at the well-documented
incidences of land grabbing that have taken
place in Kabul and elsewhere. They betray
the shortcomings in governance and the lack
of pro-poor policy direction in Afghanistan’s
current urban politics. What emerges is a
“culture of impunity” among those in power,
whose self-interest lead them to apply double
standards to the enclosure of urban land,
often at the expense of the vulnerable
settlers. The most prominent example of this
occurred in the settlement of Sherpur in
central Kabul, where high-ranking government
officials received plots of land on which they
built extravagant houses; this after evicting
and destroying the houses built by families,
who had resided there for decades.28........
This predation on urban land by the powerful
and influential is not an isolated case by any
means. According to one observer, it
represents “a microcosm of what has been
happening all over the city and the
country.”29 The impoverishment of the bulk
of urban populations residing on informal
land and the unwillingness to provide them
with services and infrastructure may well go
hand in hand with land grabbing that is
somewhat legitimised by the fact that the
perpetrators are in positions of power. This
provides a striking example of the current
lack of governance or mismanagement over
urban areas, which begs the question: How
committed is the government to promoting
equitable development?
28 Constable, P. (2003), in an article written for the Washington Post: “Land grab in Kabul embarrasses government,” 16
September.
29 Ibid.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 25
Urban Livelihoods in Afghanistan
4.2 Basic services: Water supply,
sanitation and electricity
Addressing the problem of tenure insecurity
in urban Afghanistan must be in conjunction
with infrastructure development. This is
especially needed in informal settlements,
where shortfalls in basic service delivery
create conditions hazardous to the health
and wellbeing of residents. Although the kind
of exclusion from services and infrastructure
vary from city to city and even across
communities within a city, the lack of safe
water and proper sanitation systems is a
common problem. In Kabul, only 29 percent
of the population has access to safe water,
with a huge majority relying on shallow
groundwater sources accessed through wells
and hand pumps.30 To make matters worse,
groundwater levels are steadily regressing
due to over-exploitation by a rising
population. In addition, improper waste and
waste-water disposal result in the tremendous
pollution of such water sources, contributing
to the high infant mortality rates in the
country.31 Situations in Jalalabad (50 percent
access), and especially Herat (85 percent
access), are better than in the Afghan capital,
although the water supply system in the
eastern city of Jalalabad had sustained
damage over the years through drought, civil
war, and poor maintenance.32
Evidence from the household study reveals
the following patterns and urgent issues:
• Supporting the findings of broader studies,
private water access in the study
population is a luxury (see Figure 3).
Consequently, poor urban households are
forced to send members out to haul in
supplies, a task often assigned to children.
Fetching water is time consuming,
especially when the residence is far from
the nearest public well. If this is not an
option, availing of clean, private water
requires substantial payments. For hillside
30 GoA (2004), Securing Afghanistan’s Future, p. 54.
31 Himmelsbach, T. et al. (2006), Urban Impacts on Groundwater Resources and Quality in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan,
Geophysical Research Abstracts, Vol. 8.
32 Banks, D. (2002), Water Assessment Mission to Afghanistan, January-February, Oslo.
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Figure 3.  Access to basic services in the longitudinal study sites (40 households in each city)
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dwellers in Kabul and Pul-i-
Khumri, as well as for the
numerous settlers in the desert
areas around Mazar, fetching
water is even more difficult.
People in those areas are forced
to buy water from small
entrepreneurs, who turned the
water shortage into a livelihood
opportunity. Some households
cope by collectively sharing a
donkey to carry water uphill.
In Mazar, people in remote
settlements end up relying on
a polluted stream for their
water supply. In Jalalabad, access to a
public source is closer, but the lines are
usually very long, with too many
households having to rely on a single hand
pump or public well.  Herat, in contrast,
has a comparatively high number of poor
urban households with access to private
water, but this usually comes in the form
of wells that do not provide potable water
due to groundwater pollution and soil
salizination. There are a number
of urban poor families in this
western city, which rely on
insufficient public sources.
About 200 households living in
one of the two IDP camps in
town share just two public
wells, after six others dried out
a while ago.
• In addition to lack of private
water, access to clean sources
is highly restricted for many
urban households; this appears
to be especially the case in Pul-
i-Khumri and Mazar. The fact that many
poor households in these cities rely solely
on surface water from contaminated rivers
or streams exposes them to serious health
problems, particularly young children.
There have been incidences of widespread
chronic diarrhoeal diseases among
members of poor urban households.
• In many cases, water supply is acquired
with the help of social relations, when
neighbours with private sources share
their well or water tap. This is more
evident in Kabul and Jalalabad, where
private water access is more rare than in
Herat. Good neighbourly relations have
proven to be essential in accessing water;
this is also apparent in the case of
electricity supply (see Figure 3).
• Proper sanitation systems are absent in
the disadvantaged neighbourhoods across
all study sites. While a majority of
households have access to a private toilet
(see Figure 3), this is in all cases a dry
latrine, where human waste is collected
on the spot without any kind of septic
system in place. The result is a highly
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polluted body of water that flows freely
onto public roads and is channelled into
small streams of night soil in the middle
of streets and alleys. Children play in this
highly unsanitary environment — a perfect
breeding ground for bacteria — making
them highly vulnerable to chronic
diseases.
• Exclusion from access to electricity is
widespread as well. Many urban
settlements in all cities studied have yet
to be connected to local supply networks.
But even in neighbourhoods receiving
electricity, poor urban dwellers do not
automatically get access. Running costs
are expensive and the set up of wiring,
poles and transformer facilities usually
has to be financed by communities, as
municipalities are seldom willing to
contribute. Herat, with the most reliable
power supply among all five study areas,
also has the highest number of households
able to establish private access; not
because they could afford to buy a meter.
Many of the households studied in the
western city — where house ownership is
less extensive than in other sites (see
Figure 2) — already have electricity in
their residences, given that their
occupancy is either based on renting or
charity. Neighbours often assist those
who cannot afford their own electricity
by allowing them to tap into their supply.
This kind of sharing is more common in
Kabul (see Figure 3), although some
arrangements are reciprocal. For example,
a household running a home-based bakery
provides bread in exchange for electricity.
In most cases, however, access is granted
based on charity.
4.3 Health and education
Delivery of infrastructure includes proximity
to adequate basic healthcare and educational
facilities. This is especially crucial when there
is high reliance on unsafe water sources and
a lack of sanitation services that lead to
unhygienic living environments and increase
health risks dramatically. Children are the
most susceptible to such conditions. Not
surprisingly, there is a high incidence of young
children being regularly sick among the
studied  households. There were study families
in all cities, which lost their children due to
unaffordable healthcare and medical
treatment.
It is in the areas of health and education and
the build-up of human assets that the notion
of access needs to be further clarified. Poor
urban communities may have a school nearby
but what good is it if children are deployed
to work instead of being sent to school? There
may be a clinic in the neighbourhood, but what
good is it if families could not afford emergency
care or even the most basic check-up?.....
Across study households and cities, there
were variations in: proximity to adequately
resourced and affordable social infrastructure,
health status and educational attainment,
as illustrated in the following sections.
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Health
The cities of Afghanistan are the hubs of
healthcare in the country, with countless
rural dwellers visiting urban centres to access
treatment on a daily basis. This does not
mean that facilities are abundant, or that
clinics or hospitals are well resourced. Each
of the urban sites studied has one or several
government clinics offering free service, but
medicine seems hardly available. For the
urban poor, these free but apparently low
quality facilities are the main means of
accessing healthcare. In addition to
government services, each city hosts private
hospitals and NGO clinics, both of which are
viewed to offer better quality care. However,
in spite of all sites providing some form of
healthcare, facilities remain insufficient. The
cost of consultation in the more reputable
private clinics is too expensive for the urban
poor. Moreover, many poor neighbourhoods
are located far away from health facilities,
making emergency treatment difficult to
obtain.
This combination of distance, low quality and
under-resourced facilities, and unaffordable
private healthcare prevents the urban poor
in Afghanistan from seeking preventive or
emergency treatment.
Susceptibility to poor health, arising out of
exclusion from basic services and the inability
to access quality treatment, is well reflected
in the survey data collected over the study
period. The frequency of spending for health
issues indicates a general predominance of
health problems among the surveyed families.
A significant percentage of households cope
with health-related expenditures almost every
month. Figure 4 details the frequency of
health expenditures in each study site. The
city of Jalalabad had the highest evidence
of ill health, with medical expenditures
reported in 90 percent of the monthly
monitoring interviews across all households;
median monthly spending on medicine or
treatment reached 380 Afghanis. In contrast,
Herat had the lowest reported incidence of
medical expenditures, but exhibited the
highest level of spending (450 Afghanis median
monthly expenditure). The higher cost may
reflect the comparatively better status of
service delivery in the western city.
The in-depth study in a sub-sample of
households in each site confirms the
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quantitative results. On almost every visit by
the research team, respondents reported
serious health problems encountered by
different family members in any given month.
Disability, chronic illness and children being
sick on a regular basis lead to huge difficulties
in coping with necessary health expenditures.
As a result, urban families fall easily into
debt, or lean heavily on relatives and social
networks for support.
It is important to stress that the urban poor’s
susceptibility to health problems is a
cumulative result of inadequate shelter, use
of polluted water sources and the lack of
sanitary waste and sewage disposal systems.
Moreover, poor health is a major determinant
of household vulnerability. Serious illness of
the breadwinner, or the health demands of
a sickly child or an aging family member can
push poor households to insurmountable levels
of poverty. This becomes particularly evident
when the earner in a one-income family falls
ill; the household will have to find ways to
cope with the loss of income. If the degree
of income diversification is low, the wellbeing
of the entire household can be at risk.
In general, there was no evidence of
preventive healthcare sought by the household
samples. The trend was to act only when
confronted by a health issue, rather than be
proactive about healthcare. In many cases,
coping with an illness or disease requires
mobilising resources (i.e. money and credit)
from social networks. But with the high cost
of healthcare, poor urban families could not
afford to make it a priority.
Figure 4.  Frequency of expenditures on health problems (recorded during monthly monitoring interviews)
Box 2. Illness, coping and vulnerability
There are countless examples in all study sites of
chronic sickness and ill health affecting poor urban
households and seriously hampering their efforts
to manage a sustainable livelihood. People do not
have the means to cope with a sudden health shock,
more often than not requiring them to go into
debt, to settle an early marriage arrangement for
a daughter, or to delay necessary treatment.
Chronic illness likewise puts a heavy burden on
poor urban households, with regular medical
expenditures disrupting tight household budgets.
Some examples illustrate the coping strategies
pursued when it comes to health issues. The first
example is from Kabul, where the disabled head
of a household, who is a cart puller and single
breadwinner, was hospitalised after an accident.
Suddenly confronted with medical expenditures
and total loss of income, the extended family
provided support. Many visitors to the hospital
brought gifts and money; his brothers, both mobile
vendors also facing insecure situations, provided
whatever help they could; neighbours stepped in
and contributed; and the local shopkeeper gave
him a bigger loan to help overcome the difficult
time. Another example is taken from Jalalabad,
where the household sold jewellery, which came
as part of the marriage arrangement of its female
head, to cope with expenditures and income loss
after her husband suffered a blood infection. In
Herat, one household settled a marriage for its
six-year old daughter to afford the regular
expenditures required for the treatment of the
aging head of the family. A similar strategy was
applied by a household in Jalalabad, where the
bride price for a daughter engaged in her early
teens is gradually being paid to the household and
presently serves as the means to treat the
chronically sick head of household. Some families,
however, lack the physical assets to dispose of, or
their social networks are not able to provide
sufficient support. This defencelessness have led
to fatal consequences. As revealed during interviews
in Pul-i-Khumri and Mazar-i-Sharif, many families
lost a child to illness, which may have been
treatable, even preventable, if only medical
expenses were affordable.
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Education
The role of education as a means to livelihood
security is perceived by the study population
as a crucial requirement to overcome poverty
in the future. People send their children to
school whenever possible, and the urban
centres of Afghanistan mostly provide
educational facilities. Many study households
revealed a preference for practical education
for their children in the form of skills training,
or a combination of apprenticeship and formal
education. However, there are a number of
problems hindering many poor households
from providing education for all their
children:33
• Some households face a dilemma: sending
children to school would mean not having
enough income to make a living in the
present; on the other hand, depriving
them of education could mean passing
on poverty to the future generation. This
is the view for 20 percent (N=22) of the
households studied, most of which cannot
afford the outlay of income and time
involved in sending their children to
school. Families normally rely on boys for
additional income and on girls to perform
both household chores and productive
work. In famil ies  with female
breadwinners, daughters are fully
responsible for household tasks.
• Girls are generally much more likely to
be excluded from education. It is rare for
girls in poor urban households to still be
enrolled after they have reached puberty
or after their engagement. This is
especially the case in the city of
Jalalabad, where culturally, girls’
education is not a priority. Thus, many
households do not even think about
sending their daughters to school (see
Figure 5).
• Some 46 percent (N=50) of households
with school-aged children send at least
some of them to school (see Figure 6).
Elder children are more likely to be
33 Hunte, P. (2006), Looking Beyond the School Walls: Household Decision-Making and School Enrolment in Afghanistan,
Kabul:AREU.
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excluded because they are relied upon
to earn an income or take on household
work. Younger siblings usually have a
better chance to be educated. There are
also many incidences of children
successfully negotiating between work
and school. In fact, a majority of working
children also attend school. However, in
many cases attendance is irregular
because children are made to prioritise
earning an income.
• The proximity of learning facilities is an
important parameter for school enrolment
rates. When the location of schools are
at a considerable distance — as is the
case for many remotely located
neighbourhoods in all cities except for
Herat — children are more likely to be
excluded from education. Long distance
has been cited as a major reason why
children, particularly girls, stay at home
in remote communities.
• Thirty-three percent of households (N=
36) with school-aged children are able to
send them to school. This is largely due
to a favourable household composition,
such as a higher number of male adult
workers. Also, the type of work a
household is pursuing strongly influences
school enrolment. Those who have
members with a comparatively secure
job and regular income — the exception
among the study population — can afford
the opportunity cost for schooling. This
only affirms the value of a regular and
predictable flow of income to poor urban
families. For the few households that are
deeply embedded in a network of family
and social relations and who can utilise
the resources of co-residential relatives,
having these reliable social assets has
been decisive in their ability to provide
education for their children. Likewise,
the health status of potential workers
strongly influences decision making on
school enrolment. Households that send
all children for education usually have
sons who work at the same time. Thus,
school enrolment does not necessarily
mean that children are spared from
earning a living.
• Jalalabad has both the lowest enrolment
rates, as well as the lowest number of
households allowing education for all
children. This may be  attributed to the
distant location of schools, as well as the
low priority given to girls’ education.
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Figure 5. School enrolment rates among study households
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Kabul has a comparatively high enrolment
rate for both girls and boys, which can
be linked to the relatively well-placed
school facilities all across the capital city.
In Herat, enrolment is relatively weak,
although schools are in closer proximity
to most city neighbourhoods. This is due
to the exceptionally high number of both
boys and girls working for an income (see
Figure 7).
Figure 6. Number of households by school-going status of children
Figure 7. Share of school-aged boys and girls working for an income
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34 Davis, M. (2004), “Planet of Slums, Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat”, New Left Review, p. 5-34.
5. Urban Labour Markets and Household Consumption
Figure 8. Economic activities of working individuals across the study year
(share of reported incidences of work falling under each employment category)
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5.1 Urban labour markets and
income-earning opportunities
Informality is the basic feature of urban
livelihoods in Afghanistan. This is not only in
terms of land and housing, but also in relation
to work and income opportunities. Informal
employment is a lifeline for the great majority
of the urban population. The problem is, as
the main source of livelihoods,  the informal
economy is characterised by irregularity, low
wages, unreliability, high competition and
seasonality. In spite of being the single most
important source of work, its size is not
sufficient to accommodate the steadily
growing urban population. It has been
elaborated upon elsewhere that globally:
... most informal workers (are) the
active unemployed, who have no
choice but to subsist by some means
or starve.34
This need to create one’s own marginal
economic opportunities in the informal
economy was clearly articulated by the study
sample in the three longitudinal sites. Many
livelihoods totally depend on women and
children working for extremely low income,
with some resorting to begging, experimenting
with new income activities, changing areas
of work frequently — all to grasp at every
small opportunity to earn. Reducing urban
poverty and vulnerability involves seriously
implementing what is advocated in the Interim
Afghanistan National Development Strategy
(I-ANDS): “unemployment and under-
employment are chronic problems that require
a pro-poor growth strategy.”
To be able to afford living in the city, what
kind of employment strategies do poor urban
households engage in? To answer this question,
it would be helpful to examine broader
occupational categories that fit the study
population’s income-earning activities (see
Figure 8), before breaking the categories
down into more precise household livelihoods
and discussing issues around the quality of
available opportunities (see Table 2).
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36 Scoones, I. (1998), Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis, IDS Working Paper 72. Sussex: IDS.
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to access a sufficient number of workdays
over the year. Work opportunities are highly
affected by weather conditions, fluctuations
in demand and the health status of workers,
and most respondents faced huge difficulties
in finding work over extended periods. This
is reflected in the overall low number of
productive workdays among study households
across sites (see Figure 9). In Kabul, 72
percent of all workers found employment
only for less than 200 days a year; in Herat
69 percent; and in Jalalabad 74 percent.
These values are estimated to be at the
minimum levels for creating secure livelihoods
in rural areas.36 Median days of work are
considerably below this floor. Given that
living costs in cities are usually higher than
in rural areas, this minimum seems too low
and this incapacity of individuals to find or
create more working days illustrates the
present critical state of urban labour markets
in Afghanistan. This is more obvious when
looking at actual incomes earned vis-à-vis
necessary expenditures required to afford
basic household consumption (see Section
5.3 and Table 6).
A way to deal with the problems of
seasonality, insecurity of labour and erratic
incomes is to diversify income sources by
mobilising other household members as
earners. Diversification of livelihoods is usually
carried out through children and in case of
Kabul and especially Herat, also women (see
Figure 10). Thus, household structure and
composition plays a critical role when it
comes to diversifying sources of livelihoods
and the management of urban livelihoods in
general (see Section 5.2). Figure 11 depicts
the labour force composition for one year in
one study household from Herat. The eight-
person household employed different
members at different times and frequently
changed the number of mobilised workers,
in response to needs and opportunities, while
still managing to keep at least three people
working regularly. It was largely dependent
on female and child labour, with only
occasional contributions from the male head
of the family. Although the household
maintained a more stable labour profile, this
was achieved at the cost of the children’s
education, compromising the next
Figure 9. Median days of work and share of workers employed for less than 200 days per year
Share of Female No male
workers Overall  head of HH  labour Pashtun Tajik Hazara Turkmen
Kabul .27 .36 .21 .23 .24 .41 NA
Herat .38 .49 .24 .22 .41 .33 .50
Jalalabad .25 .25 .13 .22 .37 NA NA
Table 3. Mean share of workers in the household
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Median days of
work per year
Share of workers
employed for less
than 200 days per year
Herat
96
69%
Jalalabad
120
74%
Kabul
131
72%
generation’s opportunities for sustainable
livelihoods.
Differences in shares of workers in the
households across the study sites and other
key variables of interest further support the
relevance of demographic factors and
household composition in shaping urban
livelihood strategies (see Table 3).  Households
in the Herat sample mobilise more labour
than in the other two cities and achieve the
highest median per capita monthly income
(see Table 4).  When comparing the labour
mobilisation strategies of female-headed
households and those without male labour,
one can see that female-headed households
mobilise far more workers than households
on average and than those without male
workers in both Kabul and Herat. Jalalabad
is different, likely due to the stronger
influence of Pashtun culture (80 percent of
respondents are Pashtun). This explanation
is supported by the very low labour
mobilisation among Jalalabadi households
without male labour, illustrating the rather
extreme barriers to women working, even
when there are no others in the family
available to work. The difference in share of
workers in the household by ethnicity further
supports the influence of Pashtun culture on
labour mobilisation, and particularly on
mobilising women’s labour.
Figure 10 shows the share of children and
women in overall work incidences documented
among the study population in different cities
over the study year, whereby Kabul had the
highest share of working children. Most
occupations for children, however, involve
low paid petty trades (e.g. shoe polishing,
selling chewing gum, biscuits, etc.) or
apprenticeships aimed at skills building or
very poorly remunerated assignments as shop
employees. While occupations carried out by
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Figure 11. Labour mobilisation pattern of one study household in Herat
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Figure 10. Share of women and children among all workers
Male adult workers
Male child workersFemale child workers
Female adult workers
Non-workers
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Incidences of children working Incidences of women working
Kabul
42%
27%
Herat
28%
43%
Jalalabad
22%
15%
children tended to be similar in all cities,
Herat and Jalalabad have altogether lower
shares of employed children among all
workers. For Herat, the reason is most likely
the high involvement of women in productive
activities and a somewhat better economic
situation that leads to a wider array of
informal job opportunities for the urban poor.
In Jalalabad informal work activities were
characterised by higher stability; people did
not swap occupations as frequently as they
did in Kabul. There was also high incidence
of seasonal city-to-city migration over
summer, which is when many residents of
Jalalabad seek employment in the milder
climate of Kabul. The low share of both
children and women contributing to household
incomes, however, led to a very low degree
of livelihood diversification in Jalalabad. In
fact, 55 percent of Jalalabadi households
rely on a single income source and are, thus,
highly vulnerable to complete loss of income.
The figures for Kabul (27 percent) and Herat
(15 percent) indicate less vulnerability — in
most cases, women and children were
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Table 4. Median monthly per capita income levels of households with and without a female head
and access to male labour
Median monthly per No access to Access to
capita income in: male labour male labour Female head Male head
Kabul 111 Afghanis 494 Afghanis 435 Afghanis 403 Afghanis
Herat 327 Afghanis 678 Afghanis 749 Afghanis 610 Afghanis
Jalalabad 294 Afghanis 580 Afghanis 438 Afghanis 551 Afghanis
responsible for bringing in additional income.
Surprisingly, the lower share of children
working in Jalalabad does not mean that
school enrolment rates are higher (see Figure
5). In fact, Kabul with the highest incidence
of children working also has the highest
enrolment rates.
The degree to which women are involved in
productive labour activities varies
extraordinarily between study sites, showing
the clearest difference when comparing the
results in Herat and Jalalabad (see Figure
10). In Herat the share of women working
reached surprising heights, making up 43
percent of all incidences of work in the local
study population. This is likely due to labour
markets being more vibrant in the western
city, providing more opportunities for women
to engage in home-based income activities
(see Figure 8). As it is, women’s contribution
to income is not only needed, but also viable
even in a conservative social environment
such as Herat, where purdah and honour limit
women’s activity spaces, but do not
completely constrain their ability to earn an
income.
In Jalalabad women account for only 15
percent of all workers and home-based work
makes up a mere one percent of all work
activities. Contrary to Herat, the orthodox
social environment hinders women’s
engagement in productive activities. In
addition, typically female dominated home-
based activities, such as processing of dry
fruits, washing clothes, weaving carpets or
spinning wool, do not appear to have a market
in Jalalabad. The few incidences of women
working in the eastern city virtually all relate
to households not consisting of able-bodied
male members. In Kabul, women were
responsible for more than a quarter of all
recorded work activities, often also due to
unfavourable household compositions
requiring them to take on paid work, or to
augment the male earner’s income when his
job is characterised by uncertainty.
Altogether, the findings on female labour
participation show that women in urban
Afghanistan contribute significantly to
household income generating strategies, and
it is clear that in spite of prevalent orthodox
views about women, their access to work is
a critical asset and important means of
managing urban livelihoods. Yet women are
still generally excluded from urban labour
markets. Most female dominated employment
is extremely poorly paid that women’s income
hardly justifies the effort required to carry
out the job. However, the widespread
evidence of very precarious household
situations makes involvement of women and
children in labour activities mandatory.
While labour markets across sites tend to
offer only unprotected, low wage and
altogether insufficient work opportunities,
there are significant differences between
cities as to the extent of vulnerability. Looking
at the quantitative data on actual income
generating activities documented in the three
longitudinal study sites, Herat by far offers
the best chances to access work. The 40 study
households in the city engaged in 1,274
different work activities over one
year. The figures for the other study
sites were much lower, in Jalalabad,
778, and Kabul, 625. Most of these
differences between Herat and the
other sites can be accounted for by
the high share of women working,
but they also point to the
comparatively higher economic
vibrancy of the western city as a
central hub for cross-border traffic
with Iran.
Kabul as the capital city seems miles
away from Herat’s economic
position. This despite the fact that even in
the western city, more informal work
opportunities for low-income groups do not
translate into secure livelihoods. It must be
noted that the majority of study households
in Herat were in highly precarious positions
during the study.
Nowhere do children compose such a large
share of the labour force, and nowhere do
seasonal fluctuations have a greater impact
on income-earning opportunities than in
Kabul. Even in Jalalabad, where the actual
number of work activities among study
households is not much higher and where
livelihood diversification is very low because
less women and children join the workforce,
the ability to steadily access work is
apparently easier.37 The bustling bazaars in
the city are still able to provide low but at
least steady incomes for healthy adult male
workers in informal occupations. Harassment
of mobile vendors or cart pullers is also much
less in Jalalabad than it is in Kabul. This,
together with the smaller impact of
seasonality, likely serves as an important
reason why realised incomes in Jalalabad
show less variance than in the capital city.
5.2 Household structure and the
division of labour
Household structure and composition are
critical contextual factors determining
vulnerability and livelihood security. They
are decisive for a household’s ability to
mobilise labour and therefore they influence
the possible degree of income diversification.
Further, household relations, both internal
and external, represent a critical livelihood
asset that governs access to and control over
resources for the household and its individual
members, and this is key to managing the
division of labour inside the household.
Depending on specific household structures
— i.e. nuclear or extended, female-headed,
those led by persons with disability, those
without male labour, or those which form
part of a network of co-residential relatives
— the task of managing labour and other
household concerns takes on different forms.
The changing shape of urban households
Urban households in Afghanistan are fluid
and flexible, constantly adapting to life
stages, their needs and the environment.
37 It has to be taken into account, however, that due to security restrictions only 11 months of study were accomplished in
Jalalabad, Therefore, it is possible that the number of work activities among the studied households may be higher than
what was recorded.
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Such changes in the course of the domestic
life cycle include the marriage of sons and
daughters and the consequent formation of
separate units, also in response to crises or
internal conflict. In all three longitudinal
study sites, there was evidence of households
splitting or merging for various reasons,
showing that the adjustment of household
size, structure and composition serves as a
strategy for poor urban households to cope
with shock and crisis.
More specifically, the following incidences
have been documented among the households
in the study sample.
Households split:
• When a planned transformation from a
nuclear to an extended unit after the
marriage of a son did not go smoothly
and conflict among women around
household tasks occurred.
• When non-altruism led married sons, along
with their spouses, to split in order to
avoid obligatory contributions to the costs
of major health treatments or life cycle
events of family members. This shows
that in the face of low and erratic incomes
and poverty conditions in general, people
may frequently aim to avoid collective
burdens that potentially hinder the pursuit
of their own opportunities, even if it
comes at the price of putting stress on
the family and jeopardising future social
links.
• Out of economic rationality, given that
bigger and extended households are more
difficult to maintain in urban areas. This
is why in general, smaller household units
are predominant in Afghan cities, a fact
that is also reflected in the shape of the
study sample (see Table 1).
Households merged:
• As a response to health shocks, when a
main breadwinner fell ill or died, a
formerly independent household of a son
or daughter rejoined the conjugal unit.
• When a widowed household joined a
brother-in-law’s family.
• To deal with economic decline, when
households failed to generate sufficient
income and needed to sell property
(house); they moved in with relatives.
Households adjusted their size and
composition:
• Out of food insecurity, children were sent
away to relatives in rural areas to
decrease dependency rates and to release
pressure on income generation in the
city.
• To enable education for children, who
were sent to school in native villages to
stay among relatives.
• When members left the household for
temporary labour migration to a
neighbouring country, another city or
rural province.
• When rural relatives were accommodated
during their labour migration period in
the city.
• When sons and daughters of relatives
were accommodated to support income
generation and other household activities.
Household structure and vulnerability
It is clear that family structures influence
the capacity of households to manage a
sufficient income in the city and thus are a
crucial determinant for urban livelihood
security. However, the labelling of households
according to different types or groups could
be misleading. Although female-headed
households often find themselves at less
advantageous economic and social positions,
the conclusion that all female-headed
households form a homogeneous “vulnerable
group” is not accurate, as the results in Table
4 show. In fact, households who are headed
by women are not necessarily worse off in
terms of realised incomes. On the contrary,
in the Kabul and Herat study sample, male
Table 5. Median monthly per capita income levels of households with and without members having
a disability
Median monthly  Do not have members with
incomes in: Have members with a disability a disability
Kabul 260 Afghanis 446 Afghanis
Herat 481 Afghanis 678 Afghanis
Jalalabad 500 Afghanis 570 Afghanis
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and female-headed households have similar
per capita monthly income, or female-headed
households do better, respectively. It is only
in Jalalabad where male-headed households
have the expected advantage.
One important finding of this research is that
the gender composition of the household
labour force is a major determinant of
household wellbeing in terms of earned
income, rather than the gender of the head
of the household alone. This is supported by
income data collected over the study year,
showing that households having no access to
male labour generate significantly lower
returns from work activities than those who
have (see Table 4). This is because female
occupations are often less valued and do not
generate fair incomes, and access to work
usually is highly restricted for women, making
affected households particularly vulnerable
to income shocks. Herat again is the
exception, although there appeared to be
sufficient opportunities for women to access
paid work. Only four among the local study
households did not have women working.
The inclusion of women in the labour market
is often characterised by inequity and
dependent relationships with employers. This
is apparent in the data on median daily
earnings for females and males in the three
longitudinal study cities, where in Herat
women earn an extremely low daily wage
(40 Afs compared to 60 Afs in Kabul and 90
Afs in Jalalabad). Thus, even though many
women hold jobs, their income contribution
is insignificant in terms of lifting their families
out of poverty or increasing their own status
in the household.
Another broad category of households involves
those who have to take care of disabled
members or those headed by persons with
disability. Job opportunities are much fewer
in these cases as disabled persons usually
cannot compete for wage labour in the
informal labour market and their restricted
mobility makes it difficult for them to engage
in many self-employment activities. The
ability to mobilise labour of able-bodied sons
is again a critical asset for these types of
household, as is the capacity to activate
support from social networks. There are cases
in the study sample where households headed
by persons with disability are highly
dependent on intricate social networks or
are supported by co-residential relatives
living in the same compound. These strong
social assets are often needed to access
labour, to cope with health problems or to
receive support and assistance. This is
especially apparent in Jalalabad, where
households headed by disabled persons realise
the highest incomes across the three long-
term study sites because of their ability to
access opportunities through membership in
social networks (see Table 5 and Box 5).
In general, however, households with disabled
members are income-poorer than others, as
shown in Table 5, which also emphasises how
critical health is as a household asset for
poor urban families.
Internal household relations and the division
of labour
Households are not solely a unit of sharing,
cooperation and altruism. Internal relations
are often characterised by negotiation,
38 Dupree, N. (2004), “The Family during Crisis in Afghanistan”, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 35(2):3-11.
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bargaining and conflicting behaviour, which
influence intra-household arrangements and
the wellbeing of its members (i.e., pooled
vs. non-pooled income, cooperative vs. non-
cooperative decision making, etc.). In
addition, there are several socially defined
categories making up the household, notably
gender, but also age, generation and marital
status that determine different status, roles
and responsibilities.38 As households
themselves are microsystems of resource
allocation this hierarchy may well work to
the disadvantage of some members (for
instance when some children are excluded
from education), and the actual modes of
labour division and quality of internal relations
can be critical factors determining household
vulnerability.
Internal divisions of labour across study sites
are characterised by traditionally ascribed
gender roles, with women assigned to
household chores and men largely responsible
for income generation. The fact that many
women also work for an income, however,
has consequences. Often, it means women
have to carry the double burden of performing
household chores, as well as supplementing
the household income. In households where
women work extensively, as is the case mainly
in Herat and Kabul, daughters are burdened
with the household chores, leading to their
exclusion from education. Many women and
young girls additionally have to deal with
restrictions in terms of their mobility, with
their movements and behaviour controlled
and monitored by men and senior women in
the household. This hampers women’s access
to services and employment across the study
sites. Likewise, participation of women in
internal decision-making processes is generally
low, and the patriarchal nature of families
puts control over income in the hands of
men.
While it is difficult to assess a general trend
in intra-household relations among the diverse
study population, it is clear that the social
institution “household” by no means can be
perceived as a completely cooperative unit.
Rather, many study households are
characterised by:
• Competing interests between different
members, i.e. when daughters are
excluded from education because they
reach puberty or are required to work in
the house, or when sons are made to
work for an income instead of continuing
their education;
• Conflicts between spouses about marrying
off daughters in order to obtain bride
price; daughters are never consulted when
it comes to deciding about their future
fate, and child marriage turned out to
be a very common feature among most
study households;
• The need to adjust to external events,
leading women and children to enter paid
work;
• Patriarchal behaviour, non-cooperative
decision-making processes;
• Cash resources largely being controlled
by men;
• Permeability of boundaries, in that co-
residential members of the extended
family or kin often influence decision-
making processes;
• Undervalued household responsibilities
and the perception of women’s
contribution to household wellbeing as
“natural” rather than necessary; and
• Constraints on the freedom of movement
of women.
From a livelihoods perspective, these issues
have implications. Non-cooperation, non-
pooling and conflict in any given household
may put the livelihoods of individual members
at risk. Evidence suggests that economic
poverty and a cycle of unemployment may
Table 6.  Median per capita incomes and expenditures in three study sites
Median monthly per Median monthly per
capita incomes  capita expenditures
Median share of total expenses
Food Medicine Fuel
Kabul 409 Afghanis 578 Afghanis 52% 8% 9%
Herat 640 Afghanis 555 Afghanis 58% 11% 9%
Jalalabad 543 Afghanis 600 Afghanis 68% 11% 5%
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work to disrupt intra-household relations and
trigger domestic violence.
5.3 Coping with risk: consump-
tion, credit and debt
Cash is indispensable in the urban
environment, where commoditisation of
virtually all aspects of life requires poor urban
households to generate an income that is
sufficient to afford basic consumption and
food security. This is a challenge for the
study population across the board. Cost of
living in Afghan cities is high, and with low
and erratic incomes, cash is not always
available to feed the family, to pay rent, or
to buy fuel or medicine. In fact, the overall
findings on income and consumption —
monitored on a monthly basis among the 40
study households in each city — clearly show
that on average and over time, the cost for
the most basic needs usually exceeds income,
(see Table 6). Again the city of Herat is an
exception. It is the only place where the
urban poor on average generate sufficient
income to cover their expenditures. This is
most likely due to the higher degrees of
labour diversif ication and income
opportunities and the large number of women
contributing to household incomes.
Consumption structures among study
households show the high share of income
required for basic food expenses. High shares
of food expenditures in relation to total
expenses are typically considered a good
indicator for income-poverty, as shares usually
decrease with a rising income. However, in
the cold winters of Afghanistan food is not
the only factor that puts pressure on budgets.
Expenses on fuel and medicine can also put
a dent on income. Food expenses, however,
always account for more than half of total
expenditures (see Table 6) but costs for fuel
in Kabul and Herat, and medical expenses
across sites, take major shares of monthly
consumption for poor urban households. Those
who have to pay rent on top of these basic
necessities are in the least advantageous
position. Many cannot afford to pay house
rent in the first place and accumulate debts
with their landlords. For those who do pay,
rental expenses have a high share in total
consumption: 30 percent in Kabul, 28 percent
in Herat and 17 percent in Jalalabad.
The income and consumption data collected
clearly point to a central problem for poor
urban households: the inability to establish
savings that they can rely on during
emergencies, or to cope with seasonality,
income loss and other shocks. In all cities,
the numeric evidence shows that living hand-
to-mouth is widespread, severely constraining
the capacity to cope with a health crisis, for
example. Under these conditions, people are
forced to obtain cash through other means,
which is where access to credit becomes a
critical livelihood strategy.
The significance of credit becomes evident
when looking more closely at specific
households and their financial flows over the
year. Figure 12 provides a detailed overview
of the experience of one study household
from Kabul, which exemplifies the constant
threat of income insecurity and to
what extent households cope with
loss of income through access to
credit. This household made most
of its earned income by home
production of birdcages, which was
supplemented by the female head
going out on excursions to Kabul’s
rural vicinity with a larger group
of females to trade cosmetics for
a small profit. However, it is
apparent from the figure that
seasonality has a crucial effect on
this household — home production
came to a complete halt in the
winter because the fine wood used
in this craft cannot stand up to moist
conditions. Meanwhile, the female member’s
outdoor cosmetic sales had to stop as well.
In addition, the female head suffered from
a chronic health issue, severely hindering her
income activity. Subsequently, there were
times in the study period where this household
had no earned income at all and needed to
borrow in order to meet expenditures for
basic consumption. Heavy cuts in consumption
were implemented as a coping strategy during
various months of the study and subsequently,
patterns of spending became very erratic
while the household tried to adjust to its
changing income and flows of credit.
The experience of this household is not
unique, and finding access to informal sources
of credit probably is the most widely
implemented livelihood strategy in urban
Afghanistan. Virtually all study households
regularly approach relatives, friends or
shopkeepers for a loan, and a great majority
of study households are almost constantly in
debt because their income is insufficient to
pay for their basic needs. There are however
some differences across study cities, and
although most households in all sites have to
Figure 12. Financial flows in a study household from Kabul
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Reasons for current
flows of credit
N = 247 responses
• Consumption 64%
• Healthcare 21%
• Fuel 11%
• Rent 7%
• House maintenance 3%
• Productive assets 3%
• Ceremonies 5%
• Other 8%
N = 119 responses
• Consumption 56%
• Healthcare 19%
• Fuel 6%
• Rent 3%
• House maintenance 3%
• Productive assets 5%
• Ceremonies 9%
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N = 195 responses
• Consumption 68%
• Healthcare 31%
• Productive assets 2%
• House maintenance and
rent 12%
• Ceremonies 3%
• Other 11%
Median levels of
indebtedness
18,400 AfghanisKabul
Table 7. Reasons for taking credit among the study population
Herat
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5,000 Afghanis
15,000 Afghanis
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City
rely on credit, there are differences in degrees
and frequency.
Kabul has the most people relying on constant
credit to afford basic consumption — 56
percent of respondents answered affirmatively
when asked if they had taken credit in a
given month over the study period. In
Jalalabad, this value reached 41 percent,
and in Herat only 25 percent. This is congruent
with findings on incomes and expenditures,
and Herat with its relative economic
prosperity and high degrees of livelihood
diversification consequently has the lowest
frequency of credit use. However, the figures
are not that much different between cities
when it comes to current outstanding debt
among sample households. Virtually all
households reported being presently indebted
in varying amounts, often for big family events
such as weddings or funerals, or for
investment purposes such as procuring
productive assets used for income generation,
or for maintaining housing.  An  overwhelming
majority of the households, however, take a
loan just to afford basic food consumption
and medical expenses (see Table 7).
Sources of credit for study households in
almost all occasions have been informal, and
buying food on credit from shopkeepers and
indebtedness to a relative, friend or neighbour
were most frequently reported across study
sites (See Figure 13).
Other important findings on credit and debt
include the following:
• Having strong social assets are needed to
have regular access to credit.
• For poor urban households, residence in
a neighbourhood with a heterogeneous
population eases access to credit from
neighbours. This is the case in Herat,
where settlements are usually more
diverse and neighbours serve much more
prominently as creditors (Figure 13).
• Endowment with vertical social relations
is decisive in order to access larger credits
Figure 13. Credit sources for the study population in three cities
Box 4. House rent and the downward spiral of indebtedness
Informal credit is a basic livelihood ingredient for the urban poor. While this fact helps to bridge times of emergency,
to afford critical investments in health treatment or productive assets, at the same time, it poses the danger of being
caught in a downward spiral of indebtedness that is difficult to escape. Examples of this are provided by households that
regularly need to take credit in order to find the money for house rent. There are a number of examples where households
failed to cope with the constant need to produce an income high enough to account for rent, on top of basic food
consumption. Inability to pay, more often than not, leads to eviction, forcing many households to regularly face unwanted
residential mobility, along with a huge burden of debts stemming from unpaid rent. The matter appears especially
pressing in Kabul, where inconsistency of rent payments is highest, but also in the other study sites, where households
go into debt to pay for their housing, sell physical assets to afford rent, or are evicted because they are not able to pay
or cope with rising rent. Most affected households aim to resettle in their old neighbourhood, where informal networks
of support or work opportunities for women have been already established. Consider the example of one household living
in Kabul: the head is a bazaar worker. His wife set up a home bakery but fell sick and needed treatment. They were
already indebted to members of the extended family to pay their house rent of 2,000 Afghanis, never knowing how to
eventually repay the accumulated amount. A new loan was needed for health treatment, and shortly thereafter, the
landlord raised the rent to 3,000 Afghanis, an amount that was not affordable and for which relatives were not able to
provide further credit. The solid neighbourhood relations they managed to create, the regular gatherings of the women
of the neighbourhood, their self-organised literacy courses, the bakery of the female household head, the nearby school
for their three daughters — all these things were seriously endangered. Fortunately, the household managed to find a
cheaper place not far from their old residence, enabling the family to keep up social relations. Still, the downward spiral
of debts is likely to continue, as the insecure and highly seasonal income of the main income earner cannot guarantee
that rent will be regularly paid.
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necessary for investments in productive
assets or ceremonial events.
• Repayment of credit often involves much
hardship, but is necessary to keep up
social relations and to re-access credit
from the same source. Strategies applied
to repay debts often involve child-
marriage to obtain bride price, mobilising
additional household members for income
generation, or simply counting on the
patience of a creditor. Inability to repay
often yields consequences. For instance,
one household literally escaped from its
debts by moving from Jalalabad to Kabul,
while another household was raided by
the lender and left bereft of any physical
assets. Often, households living in rental
housing accumulate debts to a landlord
because they cannot afford paying rent,
in many cases leading to eviction and the
loss of neighbourhood networks (see
Box 4).

The poor and vulnerable in urban Afghanistan
carry out a wide range of livelihood activities,
using a variety of assets over which they have
some control. However, given their limited
total assets and the uncertainty of the
country’s political economy, social assets are
particularly important in preventing or
managing urban vulnerability. This section
examines how and when people are able to
rely on social assets beyond the immediate
household. People’s networks are first
explored in relation to social support and
reciprocity at the neighbourhood and family
levels, and then through a review of some of
the more strategic attempts at asset building
through collective action and representation
within the context of local politics and urban
management in Afghanistan.
6.1 Neighbourhood and family
networks
In the urban context, networks of reciprocity
are generally considered to be more fragile
and unpredictable than in villages. This has
been attributed to the heterogeneity and
increasing fragmentation of Afghanistan’s
urban populations.39 While this is the case
for some urban dwellers, the present study
shows that there is considerable variation
both between and within cities. The continued
salience of customary social networks and
patterns of reciprocity apparent in many
urban communities in Afghanistan is supported
by the fact that family and neighbourhood
connections overlap quite significantly. For
instance, a large majority of study households
has relatives living in their vicinity, who act
as an important source of assistance. This
appears to be a coping strategy used by poor
urban households in Afghanistan, and the
resulting safety net represents the most
reliable defence mechanism against hardship
and multiple challenges.
This informally organised social support can
prove decisive in maintaining the livelihood
security of vulnerable households. The present
research encountered numerous examples of
this: relatives employing women to care for
their children, neighbours providing food and
credit during times of extended income loss,
or sharing information about work
opportunities. Thus, it is not surprising that
poor and vulnerable people invest seemingly
disproportionate amounts of time and energy
in developing and protecting their social
assets: visiting distant relatives, attending
festivals together, investing time and
resources in supporting people through life
cycle events, such as weddings and funerals
in the confident knowledge that their efforts
will be reciprocated. Social support can also
take the form of community level collective
assistance, exercised on behalf of members
victimised by social injustice. This was
illustrated by a settlement in Herat (see Box
5).
The informal social networks of the urban
poor, however, very rarely extends beyond
their own neighbourhood or circle of relatives.
There is very little evidence of bridging social
relations among the urban poor in
Afghanistan, which poses a particular
problem. While the majority of them appear
to be endowed with strong social assets that
are indispensable to maintain existing
livelihood outcomes, their networks basically
work on a survivalist level and the resources
that can be acquired through them rarely
allow people to rise above poverty. This is
also the reason why the urban poor’s social
networks remain highly vulnerable to overuse:
without basic material resources in place,
mutual assistance is difficult to sustain and
continued reliance on social assets is likely
to erode existing networks. Informal social
6. Asset Building through Collective Action and 
Representation
39 See Beall and Esser (2005).
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protection systems may thus quickly reach
their limits, especially among those
households forced to pursue the most
precarious and vulnerable livelihood
strategies. They are more at risk of over-
reliance on such social connections and are
less able to reciprocate. As such, the issue
of informal safety nets is double-edged. Their
critical importance for urban livelihood
security can hardly be overemphasised, yet
under conditions of poverty the maintenance
of social networks can become a laborious
and sometimes even impossible task. The
avoidance of every collective burden that
potentially hinders the pursuit of their own
opportunities turns into a deliberate strategy
for many among the urban poor, even if it
40 Landolt, P. (2004), Eine Abwägung der Grenzen Sozialen Kapitals: Lehren aus den transnationalen Gemeinde-Initiativen El
Salvadors, F. Kessl and H.U. Otto (eds) Soziale Arbeit und Soziales Kapital, Zur Kritik lokaler GemeinschaftlichkeitOpladen;
Beall, J. (2001), Valuing Social Resources or Capitalising on Them? Limits to Pro-Poor Urban Governance in Nine Cities of
the South, International Planning Studies.
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Box 5. Access to opportunities through social
networks and neighbourhood support
The importance of informal support networks is
especially apparent in this example of a household
in Herat, headed by a man caring for his mentally
ill wife: they lived a destitute life in a destroyed
house with a single room without windows,
bathroom, or  kitchen. Elders of the neighbourhood
met to address the issue and decided to provide
this household with a small room attached to the
mosque to use as a shop, plus a loan to invest in
supplies. It is conveniently located next to a school
making children the main customers. The store
provided the household with a feasible livelihood
opportunity. When the owner of their residence
decided to reconstruct the building where they
squatted, the family was evicted and the entire
household needed to move into the tiny shop for
temporary shelter. Again, the local community
stepped in and allowed them to construct a bigger
room made of mud inside the spacious compound
of the mosque. Another example is provided in
Jalalabad, where the head of a household is an
active member of the “Afghan Disabled Union”, a
local grassroots organisation. He developed a
fruitful relationship with a government official in
the course of his voluntary work for fellow disabled
persons. This vertical relation to a powerful person
eventually led him to get hold of a piece of
agricultural land on lease, which he sublet. The
money earned allowed him to open a grocery store,
which has become this household’s main source of
livelihood.
comes at the price of putting stress on the
family and jeopardising future social links.
This fragility built into the architecture of
informal safety nets under poverty conditions
poses a serious risk for those who have to
rely on the family as their basic fallback
system, especially when there is no state-
provided or other formal social protection
system in place, as is the case in Afghanistan.
As such, strong social assets do not
automatically lead to improved well being,
and certainly not when generated out of
“networks of survival” — a phenomenon that
has been observed in other contexts as well.40
The apparent high levels of resilience of the
urban poor thus come at a price and do not
relieve the Afghan government and
international donor community from their
responsibility to pursue investments in
institutionalised social protection systems,
employment programmes and physical and
social infrastructure. The small degree to
which this happened in the past in fact
contributed to the present over-reliance of
the urban poor on their informal social
networks.
6.2 Social assets and collective
action
The seizure of land and establishment of
informal settlements is one of the physical
signs of collective action in pursuit of urban
livelihoods. When people encroach on public
lands and build without seeking official
permission, this is rarely done on an individual
basis. Evidence from Kabul and Jalalabad
confirms that land enclosures are the result
of actions undertaken by people known to
each other and loosely organised in some
way. Collective action is invariably organised
by groups with something in common, often
ethnicity. In one of the newer settlements
in Pul-i-Khumri — established for 16 years
and comprising around 110 households at the
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time of the research — land was claimed
initially by 10 Tajik families and thereafter
encroached upon by other Tajik and Pashaie
households originating from Parwan and
Kapisa Provinces, respectively. One woman
narrated what took place:
Those who came first captured a lot
of land. Afterwards, they brought in
their relatives and gave them some
space to build their house on. Some
of them also sold land to other
people.
Neighbourhood support is not simply confined
to one-off actions such as land grabbing. In
the process of establishing and maintaining
settlements, there are other institutionalised
systems of self-help and mutual support as
shown in Box 6. In older urban settlements,
it was found that residents continued to work
together to attain services or security of
tenure. In Pul-i-Khumri, for example, the
most established settlement studied was
between 60-80 years old. There, the 1,000
or so majority Tajik but ethnically mixed
households had achieved security of tenure;
the neighbourhood had even built three
mosques, indicating a degree of collective
action and representation. Patterns elsewhere
suggest that when land titling, upgrading and
service provision occurs, then more
commercialised relationships and transactions
take over, often accompanied by increasing
social heterogeneity within settlements.
Collective activities can help inject a feeling
of commonness and solidarity among
community members, even when they
originate from different places and include
returning refugees and IDPs. For example,
the study found evidence of people pooling
money for a school tent or toward the building
of a mosque. Still, where there was diversity
within a community, reciprocity was more
limited than in homogeneous settlements.
Hence, in a number of contexts it was found
that self-help systems were delimited by
tribal or ethnic boundaries. For instance in
a settlement studied in Pul-i-Khumri,
mutuality was confined solely to the Ismaili
Box 6. Indigenous systems of self-help: How
ashar and pandusi (pandavachi) are
used among study households
Indigenous practices of self-help and mutual support
in urban Afghanistan seems to be more widespread
than the common perception. This is especially so
in the case of ashar, which is a reciprocal system
of sharing work in urban areas, most commonly in
house construction or housing maintenance. Through
this practice, labour costs are kept at a minimum,
since neighbours are required to work without
payment – although once given, they have the
customary right to access labour for their own use
in return. While the practice is also used in
established settlements whenever there is bigger
maintenance work required, it is most common in
newly emerging settlements where many people
are collectively busy with the construction of
dwellings. Though this was not exactly the case in
the newly formalised settlement studied in
Jalalabad, it came close to “starting from scratch”,
as everybody living there had to give up their old
houses and were forced to reconstruct on assigned
spaces. As such, there was a lot of activity, and
all six households studied from this specific
neighbourhood were, at one time or the other,
involved in ashar, extending or receiving help from
their neighbours to be able to afford rebuilding
of housing in the first place. It is fair to state that
without this system in place, a number of residents
would not have been able to rebuild so quickly, if
at all, given the high levels of debts and hardship
all of them endure to afford the legal title for
their land.
Pandusi (also called pandavachi) is very common,
although not as widespread. Still, among the 40
households studied in Jalalabad, two have taken
a cow in terms of pandusi from relatives, using
the dairy products either for their own
consumption, or for sale. In one case, this is a
long-term agreement where the taking household
kept the cow for the entire study period.
Meanwhile, a new calf was born and the household
extended its physical assets through this system.
The second case was not as long: the household
took a cow from a brother living in the village
because he went for a period of labour migration
to Pakistan. Khana Gul, the head of household,
had difficulties feeding the cow and spent
considerable time finding food from natural sources
in the city or the countryside. This posed high
opportunity costs, since he could not be productive
during those periods. Also, the daily portion of
milk could not make up for the lost income.
Consequently, as soon as his brother came back,
he returned the cow, walking all the way with it
to the village. The experience was not lucrative
enough to sustain for Khana Gul, showing that, at
times, pandusi may also come as a burden for the
receiver. In this case, however, Khana Gul’s brother
gained from the system, as he could be sure that
his livestock had been cared for.
community and none of the Hazara households
living there was included in the system. By
the same token, in Mazar-i-Sharif it was found
that minority groups, the Hazara for example,
were excluded by the bigger groups in the
settlements.
Moreover, collective action is not always
sustained and it often stands in conflict with
the drive toward individual property rights
that lie at the heart of urban real estate
markets, whether formal or informal. This
can lead to possible tensions between
interventions aimed at land titling on the
one hand, and those aimed at community
participation in service delivery or
maintenance on the other. Nevertheless, the
research suggests that where security of
tenure is absent, people living in informal
settlements often work in concert to ward
off eviction or lobby to secure land titles.
In spite of all collective efforts, establishing
wasita or access to influence in government
remains a challenge for the urban poor. In
the absence of social connections to those
in power, people sometimes try to achieve
some influence by way of bribery, as has
been attempted by a community of returned
refugees squatting in tents on private land
in Kabul. The community pooled a significant
amount of money and approached government
officials to pursue a process of land allocation
in their native area but to no avail. The
money was taken, but the distribution of
land never occurred. This incident again
exemplifies the current degree of
misgovernance in Afghan cities and the
vulnerability of the urban poor to a multitude
of problems that require the attention of a
receptive urban government. Attitudes need
to change, to counter what was bluntly
expressed by a higher official in one of the
municipalities of the study sites: “First we
have to look after ourselves, then we can
think about the poor in our city.”
6.3 Social assets and
representation
In some contexts relationships based on trust
that extend beyond the household and family
are seen as an indicator of what has been
called “bridging social capital.”41 This refers
to the ability of organised groups or individual
households to link into decision-making and
political processes. But as demonstrated in
Section 6.1, analysis of the situation in
Afghanistan has to be more nuanced, given
that in many settlement communities, the
line between kinship and ethnic affiliations
on the one hand, and place of residence on
the other, can be very blurred. Moreover,
collective actions on the part of vulnerable
households and communities are often
reactive and responsive rather than forward
looking and strategic. When the bonds of
mutuality and reciprocity can be transformed
into civic engagement and representation of
collective community interests in decision-
making arenas, social assets can be
transformed into political assets. There is,
however, only little evidence of this occurring
in the communities studied. In fact, the
Afghan Disabled Union from the city of
Jalalabad represented the single example
encountered during the study, where a
disadvantaged social group became organised,
entered the political arena, linked up with
formal governance institutions and articulated
demands. Some of its individual members
were able to establish vertical social relations
traversing their own social boundaries, which
allowed them to access opportunities for
improving their wellbeing.
However, extending bounded networks of
social support to those that can bridge across
to policy makers, planners and intermediaries
is clearly difficult in urban Afghanistan. In
Kabul, for example, where vulnerable
communities have suffered displacement,
households are subject to insecure tenure
41 Putnam, R.D. (2000),  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon and Schuster;
Woolcock, M. (2001), “The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes”, Canadian Journal of
Policy Research, 2(1) Spring, pp. 11-17.
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and feel remote from government and
powerless in the face of authority. There is
little evidence of poor households being
involved or represented in local level decision-
making processes. Moreover, rumours abound
that when the Master Plan for Kabul is
enforced, there would be a clampdown on
informal settlements in the areas covered by
the Plan. Feelings of even greater vulnerability
and insecurity were expressed by residents
of  informal  and newly  emerg ing
settlements.This development has to be seen
in the context of poor levels of
urban governance in the capital
city, huge backlogs in service
delivery and a poor track record in
socially inclusive urban planning
processes.
It needs to be acknowledged that
Kabul faces particular problems in
terms of urban governance. As the
capital city and the seat of national
government, there is evidence of
poor coordination and even
competition between Kabul
Municipality and the relevant line
ministries. NGOs working to deliver
basic services in poor urban
settlements in the city are rarely
coordinated with those agencies planning
bulk infrastructure. Moreover, international
donors work according to their own delivery
priorities — whether it is the promotion of
land titling, or area-based infrastructure
development projects — which may not be
in line with the strategic priorities of the
Afghan government. There have been some
irregular attempts to coordinate efforts mainly
through the Urban Management Consultative
Group located in the Ministry of Urban
Development. UN-Habitat’s involvement and
leadership in this process has been important
in ensuring that lessons on community
representation and management of urban
upgrading programmes have been fed into
this forum, although greater local ownership
of the coordination process is necessary for
it to be sustainable over the longer term.
The cultural heritage conservation
programmes initiated by the Aga Khan Trust
for Culture directly involve local communities
and have been important both for providing
platforms for local representation and as a
means of demonstrating the value of
community level involvement in decision-
making and urban planning.
All urban communities in Afghanistan have
an informal council of elders or Shura that
assembles on a regular or irregular basis as
needs dictate. In addition, the wakil-e gozar
or neighbourhood representative is recognized
as the official appointee of a community and
is deemed to be the one to work closely with
the municipality and speak for community
interests. Such individuals can potentially
play an important role as an intermediary
between communities and other urban actors,
including government officials, private
developers or NGOs. For example, in one of
the settlements studied in Pul-i-Khumri, an
international NGO installed a new water
distribution system in concert with the local
wakil-e gozar  who, together with
representatives of other neighbourhoods
benefiting from the installation, organised
community participation in carrying out
manual labour, as well as the collection of
household contributions toward the project.
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Box 7: Selecting a new wakil-e gozar in
Pul-i-Khumri
The research team in Pul-i-Khumri had the
opportunity to observe first hand a rare occasion
in one of the settlements studied — a meeting of
community elders. The purpose of the meeting
was to select a new wakil-e gozar for the
neighbourhood to replace the last one after he
resigned. The meeting was taken very seriously
because the position of wakil is perceived as very
important for the community. About 25 people
from the settlement attended, all men. They
assembled on open public ground and the meeting
began with a speech by the retiring wakil explaining
the reasons for his resignation. Thereafter,
potential successors were put forward and discussed
in terms of who would be most appropriate to take
on the role. A number of elders were put forward,
alongside a much younger man in his early twenties
who had attained the highest level of education
in the neighbourhood. Many participants felt that
he would be the best choice to represent the
community because his education would be an
asset. However, he declined the offer saying that
his position would be extremely difficult among
the elders and that he might not be taken seriously
by the elderly representatives of  other
neighbourhoods and by government officials.
Thereafter, there was extensive discussion and
great effort to convince the second candidate on
the list, a 40 year old man who earned his living
through unskilled daily wage labour. Although
without education he was considered honest and
deliberate but he too was reluctant to take on the
assignment because of the adverse impact it might
have on his income-earning activities. It was only
after the community expressed their full solidarity
and support that he agreed and the following day
he was introduced to the municipality as the new
representative of the settlement. The whole
meeting took a little over half an hour but almost
all those present spoke up and the verdict was
reached by way of collective agreement.
Nevertheless, women were not present and, nor
were their ideas evidently taken into account.
In some cases, members of the Shura work
effectively in advocating for the interests of
the communities they represent. In others
they do not. In this case, the system usually
breaks down. Even when it works well it is
often in a context where women, younger
people and other marginalised groups are
excluded. In Pul-i-Khumri, the city does not
have a formal Shura system that could be
used to represent community interests, or
articulate community problems to municipal
or other government officials. The study also
shows the limitations of the informal selection
process for a new wakil-e gozar, as illustrated
in Box 7.
Hence the Shura, as a council of elders,
constitutes not only an informal system of
social support, but also a formal system of
representation by which communities can
access government decision-making and other
agencies working at the local level. There
are informal systems to ensure that the wakil-
e gozar and the elders are effective and fair
but there are no systematic mechanisms to
ensure accountability and women’s
participation. Even when community
representatives are sincere in their efforts
to improve the living conditions of their
settlements through active citizenship, they
do not always get a responsive government,
as shown in Box 8, drawn from the research
undertaken in Herat.
Mazar-i-Sharif is fairly unique among Afghan
cities in that it has functioning elected
community councils. They represent the
residents of all 10 city districts and this
arrangement has been in place for more than
a decade. The Community Forum
Development Organisation (CFDO), a local
NGO established by UN-Habitat in the mid-
1990s, was responsibile for steering the
process. Whereas similar community level
organisations in Kabul and Herat involve
themselves in community-based upgrading
activities, in Mazar, elected Shuras have
concentrated on addressing the pressing issue
of insecurity of income. Hence, most of the
199 neighbourhoods that make up the city
have introduced a variety of skills building,
income-generating activities, such as
embroidery, tailoring, pottery and baking,
as well as projects tackling literacy, computer
training and English classes. In principle,
these community councils are inclusive of
women and younger people, and in fact many
skills building programmes are headed by
women and the youth.
The  i n t e r v i ewed  ne i g hbou rhood
representatives (referred to as Kalantar),
which often work in cooperation with the
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Shuras in Mazar, also reported that they
repeatedly went to see government officials
to address issues critical to their communities,
such as inadequate water supply, deficient
electricity networks or the absence of
educational and health care facilities.
However, due to lack of capacity and
resources the municipality of Mazar is not in
a position currently to pursue even minor
infrastructure projects, so that efforts at
representation are fairly futile.
Thus, while social assets often lead directly
to community level collective action, they
translate less easily into representation. In
the first place, social asymmetries at the
community level mean that not all members
are similarly represented, with the interests
of more powerful groups usually prevailing.
Moreover, representation involves a two-way
street, implying a responsive government,
which is not always forthcoming in the urban
context, whether due to resource constraints
or lack of political will. There is overlap and
competition between national and local
government agencies operating in cities and
this leads to a confusing institutional dynamic,
where, in a highly politicised environment,
the responsibility for urban development
rests in everybody and nobody. Thus, in
exploring the impact of collective action,
representation and local governance on urban
livelihoods, it is imperative that the power
dynamics at work are recognized and taken
into account.
Box 8: Communities and the failure of urban
governance
Attempts by community representatives to establish
links with municipal or government authorities in
order to improve living conditions in their
settlements are not a common occurence. When
they do happen, they could turn out to be a futile
endeavor. Two examples occurred during a year of
studying vulnerable communities in Herat. The
first relates to a settlement of internally displaced
people living in the city. They had repeatedly sent
delegations to government authorities in pursuit
of security of tenure, but all efforts taken to
demand their right to the city were not yielding
results, and insecurity of tenure remains a serious
and threatening problem for dwellers in the
“camps”. The second example refers to a
community delegation representing a settlement
predominantly inhabited by Hazaras, who contacted
the municipality and demanded the improvement
of a short stretch of road that connects their
neighbourhood to the rest of the city. The bad
condition of the road posed a serious problem to
the community in which a majority makes a living
by pulling cart or mobile vending, as people cannot
traverse easily with their vehicles. However,
although the delegation was received and their
problem acknowledged, no subsequent municipal
action had been taken.
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This report reinforces the understanding that
Afghan people are resourceful. They have
survived decades of war and displacement.
In the absence of significant economic activity
and responsive governance, they have proven
to be capable of providing for themselves,
both through individual household effort, as
well as collectively. When opportunities for
interaction have presented themselves, they
have invariably engaged creatively with
government. Under such circumstances it can
be tempting for policy makers to continue
to rely on the energy and resourcefulness of
vulnerable people, setting aside their own
responsibilities to deliver even the most basic
services to poor urban residents. One of the
key issues highlighted by this report is that
there are limits to the resources of the urban
poor. The disruption characterising the last
30 years has significantly depleted their
material assets. The weakness of the national
economy renders them even more vulnerable,
with very limited access to employment and
income-earning opportunities and high
dependence on borrowing. Moreover, the
onerous burden placed on customary patterns
of communal support and reciprocity
intensifies the pressure on their social assets
and threatens their ability to rely on social
relations as a safety net in times of crisis.
Against these insights, the most important
lesson for policy makers and urban planners
is: while it is important to recognize the
resilience and resourcefulness of the urban
poor, this is not a strategy. Poor people
already face many barriers within a
dysfunctional institutional environment. It is
the responsibility of the state to rectify its
own misgovernance and create an
environment supportive of the livelihoods of
the urban poor. This final chapter examines
the implications of the study’s findings for
national level policy, as well as urban policy
and city planning and practice.
7.1 Key findings
The key findings of the research directly
inform policy implications as enumerated
below:
• Poor and vulnerable urban households
are exposed to constant variation and
change. This is manifested in high
insecurity of labour and income, which
forces people to constantly adjust and
readjust their occupational activity. This
means they have to rely on erratic and
short-term income flows.
• The most vulnerable households also
regularly shift residence, both in pursuit
of work and to avoid steadily rising rents,
leading to insecurity of shelter. This is in
a context where housing represents the
most important physical asset poor urban
households can aspire to and acquire.
• Household structure and composition is
a key determinant of wellbeing — with
those households able to mobilise male
labour being better off than those unable
to do so. Urban vulnerability is critically
linked to health, particularly those of
male breadwinners. This affects food
security, which influences the health of
the entire family.
• Labour is the most important asset that
can be mobilised by the urban poor.
Coping with shocks and insecurity leads
many households to activate additional
labour in the form of working women and
children, invariably at very low
remuneration. This tends to erode the
health status and educational attainment
of such households. Moreover, some
occupations for women and children, such
as carpet weaving or begging can be a
threat to health and safety.
• Social infrastructure and access to basic
services is highly restricted for the urban
poor due to a combination of unwillingness
to serve the poor, low resources and lack
of capacity among responsible agencies.
The lack of access to services affects the
capacity of the urban poor to earn
adequate income and acquire the
necessary human assets to take advantage
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of  ava i lab le  opportunit ies  for
advancement.
• The asset base of many vulnerable urban
households is not sufficiently diversified
to lift them out of poverty in any lasting
way. Their reliance on scant resources
puts pressure on their coping mechanisms.
This applies to households that depend
on paid labour, as well as those that rely
on the goodwill and support of others.
Social networks are vulnerable to overuse
and tend to deteriorate, if not collapse,
when rel ied upon extens ively.
• There is little evidence of poor and
vulnerable households being involved in
local level decision making processes.
This relates to the control of community
level organisations by male elders, who
do not always represent the more
marginalised members. Confounding the
situation is the poor quality of urban
governance currently being exercised in
Afghan cities. The latter is evident not
only in the huge backlogs in service
delivery but also in terms of the absence
of socially inclusive or even consultative
urban planning.
7.2 Implications for national
policy
The most critical policy issue drawn from the
research focuses on the economy and on
strategies to stimulate broad-based labour
intensive growth at the national and city
levels. The acute insecurity of income, the
high level of dependence on poorly paid
casual work, as well as the proliferation of
livelihoods pursued across the informal
economy are all evidence of an economy in
which the potential for urban job creation
remains limited. This must change.  Possible
policy approaches include:
• Evaluating Afghanistan’s more open
market approach against the possible
economic and employment gains from
import substitution and protectionism in
some key industries, such as cement and
cotton/textiles.
• Ensuring that opportunities for good
quality work are valued as much as the
quantity of jobs created. Thus, a holistic
strategy supporting urban employment
creation must include market analysis of
demand for higher value products and
the labour and skill requirements
associated with them. This must be
combined with the development of
appropriate vocational training and formal
education programmes to develop a labour
force with the appropriate skills.
• Developing a broad planning framework
that anticipates the continuing increase
in urban populations, resulting from the
influx of returnees from neighbouring
countries, as well as from pull factors
drawing rural residents to urban areas.
• Facilitating the participation of women
in the urban labour force under improved
conditions, where their work is valued
appropriately and they are given a real
choice about place of work. In addition,
the burden of household work must be
reduced by supporting community child
care initiatives and improving access to
basic services.
A second critical national policy issue is to
redress the imbalance caused by the present
predominantly rural focus of development
assistance in Afghanistan. The implementation
of genuine nationwide programmes is
imperative in order to combat urban as well
as rural poverty on a scale that will have
impact. The efforts of the National Solidarity
Programme (NSP) to support livelihoods and
to enable poor people to better manage risk
are fairly well advanced but its location in
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development suggests a rural bias. Urban
poverty is a complex and growing problem
in Afghanistan that requires a policy response
now. Recommended responses include:.......
• Designing and implementing nationwide
urban poverty reduction programmes to
improve the quality of life of the urban
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poor at a scale approaching the reality
of the problem. These programmes must
recognisze the inter-linkages between
the myriad problems underlying urban
poverty and take an integrated versus
sectoral approach, linking job creation,
skills building and urban service provision,
as well as improving urban governance.
• Streamlining coordination and cooperation
be tween  l i ne  m in i s t r i e s  and
municipalities.  Much of the backlog in
service provision and barriers to pro-poor
urban development derive from the
inability and unwillingness of government
agencies to work together. Incentives
must be developed to ensure effeciency.
Successful coordination structures from
other countries could be studied and
adapted in developing effective urban
governance institutions in Afghanistan.
• Increasing donor support for the
development and implementation of
urban poverty reduction and capacity
building programmes within government
institutions. Supporting sustainable urban
development requires medium to long
term financial commitments, not short-
term funded pilots that are not brought
to scale. Donor support must be
comprehensive to achieve successful
institutional reforms.
Another national level policy implication is
the need to increase the human capital of
the urban poor through improved access to
quality healthcare and education.  In many
of the settlements studied, government clinics
were limited in number or in their ability to
adequately serve the growing numbers of
poor urban residents. Distance to schools and
the quality of education were also key factors
that bring down enrolment rates of girls and
boys.  These outcomes lead to the following
policy needs:
• Extend affordable and proximate health-
care facilities into or close to poor urban
neighbourhoods, allowing low income
groups to regularly access both
preventative and curative care.
• Plans for the allocation of new schools
must be made in a way that distributes
access equitably across urban locations
to promote school attendance.
• Efforts to provide proper school buildings
should be accompanied by greater efforts
to ensure quality teaching and teaching
support.
A final national policy requirement is to
develop risk mitigating social protection
programmes, supporting a shift away from
reliance on the coping capacity and
resourcefulness of the urban poor themselves.
Their asset portfolios are not sufficiently
diversified to protect households against
economic trends and shocks or to lift them
out of poverty in a lasting way. Thus, it is
the state’s responsibility to protect the most
vulnerable and to promote asset
diversification to reduce livelihood insecurity.
The following are recommended to fulfill this
responsibility:
• Develop and finance national social
protection programmes to support the
most vulnerable (families without able
bodied male workers, families dependent
on disabled members for income, etc.)
and to invest in programmes supporting
asset diversification for the poor to assist
them out of poverty.
• Provide donor support for urban poverty
reduction programmes that go beyond
physical upgrading and technical service
provision to address social insecurities.
• Build the political will and capacity of
national and city level actors (both
government and non government) to
improve their abilities to address social
protection issues at the required scale in
the urban sector.
In sum, when poor urban households do not
have the asset base to withstand stress, then
precautionary efforts aimed at reducing the
impact of potential shocks rest with national
level policy. Similarly, when household coping
strategies do not enable families to recover
from shocks, then reactive solutions designed
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to soften the impact of adversity also rest
with the national government, as well as
international development agencies involved
in both relief and development.
7.3 Implications for urban policy
and city planning
The biggest challenge facing urban policy
and city level planning in Afghanistan is
negotiating a path between the reality of
burgeoning informality and the rigidity of
formal master planning across all its major
cities. The commitment to Soviet-style urban
planning is understandable among those
trained in this way. However, master planning
has been discredited due to its top-down
nature, inflexibility and lack of ownership
among city residents. Instead, more flexible
tools that are responsive to the diversity of
urban needs and voices need to be adopted.
This is particularly true in urban contexts
characterised by informality — whether in
economic activity or the development of
settlements — where flexibility and inclusion
of the marginalised are necessary to achieve
more equitable urban development. Thus,
the first recommendation involves:
• Building capacity among municipal leaders
and staff to move them away from a
solely technical planning approach linked
to a master plan. Help them accept the
importance of including citizens in the
planning process and to develop more
flexible tools reflecting the on-the-ground
reality of all urban residents, particularly
the poor.
Another vital point for city-level action,
supported by national policy is the recognition
and legalisation of informal settlements.  It
is important that policy makers value the
huge housing investments informal settlement
dwellers have made and recognize their “right
to the city”. Continuing threats of eviction
and failure to engage in negotiations over
upgrading and tenure security are
unacceptable, especially when made in the
name of moribund master plans. Required
actions include:
• Developing a national urban land policy
in line with the aim of equitable
development. Establish guidelines and
categories for municipalities that would
facilitate recognising and legalising
existing informal settlements.  The policy
must also consider how to accommodate
the minority living on untenable land.
• Rectifying past land grabs to ensure that
the perpetrators are stripped of
“ownership” while protecting current
residents from immediate eviction.
• Providing security of tenure to residents
in recognized informal settlements, with
recommendations for approaches to land
titling coming from an analysis of best
practices in other similar post conflict
and Islamic contexts.
Informality and reliance on master plans that
do not recognize informal settlements are
often the reasons given for not extending
services to certain areas. Thus, establishing
clear legal status for informal settlements
and including them in future planning
processes are the first steps on the long road
to ensuring universal coverage with basic
services (water, drainage and sanitation,
electricity, access roads). This will not be a
simple task due to the range of line ministries
involved, the competing roles of municipalities
and other government institutions in service
provision, the resources (human and financial)
required, and the difficult issues of service
standards, cost recovery and subsidies.
However, the benefits to the urban poor of
improved access to basic services will be
substantial in terms of improved health status
and productivity.  Moving incrementally
toward universal coverage will require:
• The political will among state institutions
to serve the poor.
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• Improved communication between
government institutions involved in service
delivery, including a detailing of roles
and responsibilities and establishing a
means of coordination.
• Improved communication and coordination
between government and non-government
agencies involved in service provision,
for better distribution of  responsibilities
and to share lessons learned and best
practices.
• Community consultation, involving both
women and men, to devise appropriate
service standards and allocate operation
and maintenance responsibilities.
• Technical creativity in devising ways to
deliver services to some harder to reach
areas, ensuring that the work of disparate
agencies links up at the city level.
• Recognition of the employment creation
potential of service delivery and
involvement of poor urban residents
(women and men) as small scale
entrepreneurs.
There are important opportunities at city
level for recognising the important
contribution of informal economic actors to
the city and not associating “informal” with
“backward”. This is particularly the case for
vendors, street sellers and cart pullers, who
are among the most excluded informal actors.
Some suggestions to rectify this include:
• Vendors and street sellers and their role
in the urban market should be
acknowledged, not as a nuisance, but as
important contributors to the economic
life of the city. Recognition can come
through some form of licensing,
transparently developed to avoid chances
of unscrupulous rent-seeking.
• The needs of street vendors and the
importance of local markets must be
recognized in city plans; they must be
planned for and not marginalised.
• Institute an inclusive consultation process
to discuss how to regulate informal
economic activity and to ensure that the
needs of informal actors and the
municipalities are represented. This
means ending harassment and rent-
seeking and guaranteeing that vending
activities do not impinge on the effective
operation of municipalities.
7.4 Conclusion
The need for cooperation and collaboration
between different government and non-
government agencies has been raised
repeatedly in this report.  Its importance for
making any progress on urban poverty
reduction cannot be stressed enough.
Governance-related issues relevant to urban
poverty reduction include:
• Establishing more transparent processes
of serving the poor that reduce
opportunities for rent-seeking. 
• Developing systems to hold all agencies
involved in the urban sector accountable
for positive results.
• Involving representatives of poor
communities in consultations, at the very
least, and in other more substantial ways
( i .e .  through employment)  as
appropriate......
It will be difficult not to have multiple
agencies involved in urban poverty reduction
programmes because of the range of expertise
required. Government officials and private
contractors often have the technical expertise
required for programme delivery, while NGOs
and community-based organisations are better
equipped to undertake needs assessments
and to mobilise urban residents into decision
making and cooperative processes. Similarly,
there are complex negotiations to be had
when pursuing security of tenure through
land titling. This is especially so in the wake
of displacement, multiple occupation of land
and repair and extensions to property. The
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difficulties involved in consultative and
collaborative planning, whether around
service provision and maintenance or land
allocation and titling, are often considerable.
They require willing and cooperative
interaction between residents, city officials,
private sector developers and local and
international agencies. However, the research
suggests that it is sometimes very difficult
for city governments to work effectively and
in concert with the Ministry of Urban
Development and other line ministries, such
as those concerned with roads and transport.
Their interactions tend to be disrupted by
misunderstandings or competition over
resources, or complicated by different
approaches to common problems. The
institutional environment is rendered even
more complex by the presence of a wide
array of international development agencies
intervening in the urban context, ranging
from the World Bank, UN-Habitat and a
number of bilateral funders, to international
NGOs such as the Aga Khan Trust for Culture
and CARE. Coordination and cooperation
among them and with national ministries and
municipal governments are critical for the
achievement of effective urban policy and
city planning.
The application of a livelihoods perspective
to urban settings can serve to obscure the
social asymmetries at work within individual
settlements and citywide, as well as the
complexity of the institutional context in
which both local and national politics and
power dynamics are played out. This is not
the intention of this report. On the contrary,
an important aim has been to identify how
the presence or, more often, absence of
urban governance has influenced the asset
portfolios of the urban poor. In the case of
Afghanistan, our findings suggest that the
livelihoods of the urban poor have been
deeply affected by the inability of national
ministries and municipal governments to
manage the country’s cities and the rapid
social, political and economic changes they
face. When they are well managed, city
governments can mitigate the need for ex-
ante and ex-post strategies in relation to
urban livelihoods, through preventative
measures that protect the urban poor, for
example in relation to service delivery, public
safety and the liveability of the environment.
If urban policies and city planning are to yield
real results, they have to take place in a
context where city governments have
sufficient powers, resources and staff to be
able to deliver services. There needs to be
a spirit of collaborative planning and
partnership involving local citizens and the
private sector, as well as cooperation between
different levels of government. Urban
governance and city planning that is
supportive of the livelihoods of the poor
cannot evolve in a climate of mistrust
between citizens and those who govern them.
Similarly, accountability must replace the
current practice of finger-pointing and blame-
game between those responsible for service
delivery. Achieving these goals will take time
and requires a great deal of effort and
collaboration among stakeholders. It is hoped
that the energy and resilience of the poor
and vulnerable urban dwellers of Afghanistan
will provide the inspiration to alleviate urban
poverty. They deserve nothing less.
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